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Something is Not Always Better
than Nothing: Problematizing
Emerging Forms of Jus Ad Bellum
Argument
David Hughes and Yahli Shereshevsky*
ABSTRACT

Since the adoption of the UN Charter, an unending debate

concerning the permissible exceptions to the use of force
prohibition has filled the pages of countless law reviews. The
resulting legal regime, the jus ad bellum, has become increasingly
strained as the internationalcommunity faces new threats and
encounters unforeseen scenarios. The post-war legal architecture
is, so the debate goes, either insufficiently enabled to address
contemporary challenges or consistently undermined by actors

who seek exceptions to the strict limits placed upon state conduct.
Debates regardingdifferent instances when force is used exhibit

a predictablepattern. Those that wish to limit the scope of the
permissible use of force by states (minimalists) offer legal
arguments that emphasize the importance of adhering to a strict

reading of the UN Charter. Responding, those that support
broadening the instances in which force is permissible
(expansionists)provide moral arguments that stress the need to
bridge the gap between what the law says and what is required

to ensure a just internationalsociety. This Article identifies a
significant shift in the structure of this debate. Following the
controversial airstrikes by US, French, and UK forces in Syria,
proponents of an expansionist approach have moved from
pursuing moral arguments about the necessity of armed

intervention to embracingargumentative techniques that attempt
to nullify minimalist apprehensions. The Article describes three
forms of emergent expansionist arguments that have altered the
traditionalform of expansionist claims. Each instance suggests
that good-faith expansionist efforts to ensure the legitimacy of the
ad bellum regime are undermined by this emerging
argumentativeprioritization. The Article concludes by proposing
reversion to a form of legal argument that accentuates moral

implications and positions international law to maintain its
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relevancy by effectively contributingto the redressof many of the
most consuming challenges that face a nonideal world.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In February 2018, Bashir Al-Assad began an offensive to reclaim

the Damascus suburb of Eastern Ghouta. Week after week, the Syrian
military conducted airstrikes. Barrel bombs and cluster munitions
devastated residential neighborhoods that were home to nearly four
hundred thousand.1 By the end of February, human rights monitors

*
David Hughes is the Trebek Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Ottawa,
Faculty of Law and Yahli Shereshevsky is a Postdoctoral Fellow in The Federmann
Cyber Security Center at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. A special thanks to
Monica Hakimi, Steven Ratner, David Glazier, Itamar Mann, and Elad Gil for their
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the Rule of Law Under Extreme Conditions Seminar. Finally, we extend our sincere
thanks to Courtney DeVore and the editorial team at the Vanderbilt Journal of
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reported that well over five hundred people had been killed. At least
120 were children. Thousands more were injured. 2 Hospitals and other
medical facilities were targeted. 3 Amnesty International announced
that civilians were trapped in a "daily barrage of attacks that [were]
deliberately killing and maiming them, and that constitute flagrant
war crimes." 4 UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres described
Eastern Ghouta as "hell on earth."5
As the fighting peaked and the death toll rose, the Security
Council adopted a resolution (Council Resolution 2401) demanding
that all parties to the conflict allow a "durable humanitarian pause for
at least 30 consecutive days."6 The ceasefire resolution followed years

of Security Council paralysis. Since the earliest stages of the Syrian
civil war, Russian officials had pledged to veto any attempt by states
to seek Security Council authorization to intervene. 7
The thirty-day humanitarian pause failed to curb the ceaseless
violence. In the two weeks that followed the adoption of Council
Resolution 2401, more than a thousand were killed. 8 Then, on April 7,
2018, the Syrian Government deployed chemical weapons in Douma.
The World Health Organization reported forty-three deaths from

Transnational Law whose careful attention improved this Article considerably. Mistakes
are our own.
1.
Alex Ward, "Siege, Starve, and Surrender":Inside the Next Phaseof the Syrian
Civil War, VOx (Feb. 28, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/2/28/17057736/syriaeastern-ghouta-attack-assad [https://perma.cc/8UCF-4FLA] (archived Sept. 18, 2020).
2.
Syria War: Air Strikes in Eastern Ghouta 'Kill 500', BBC NEWS (Feb. 24,
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43182854 [https://perma.cc/BY8V4LPY] (archived Aug. 31, 2010); see also Rescuers in Syria's Ghouta Unable to Count
Dead as Bombing Continues, MIDDLE EAST EYE (Feb. 24, 2018, 3:25 PM),
https://www. middleeasteye.net/news/rescuers-ghouta-say-they-cannot-keep-deathcount-bombardment-continue-493676101 [https://perma.cc/Q7HF-H5VD] (archived Aug.
31, 2020).
3.
Martin Chulov, Medical Crisis in East Ghouta as Hospitals 'Systematically
Targeted', GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 2018, 12:33 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2018/feb/22/eastern-ghouta-medical-crisis-as-hospitals-systematically-targeted
[https://perma.c/HMM7-UDXL] (archived Aug. 31, 2020).
Syria: Relentless Bombing of Civilians in Eastern Ghouta Amounts to War
4.
Crime, AMNESTY INT'L (Feb. 20, 2018, 5:44 PM), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/
news/2018/02/syria-relentless-bombing-of-civilians-in-eastern-ghouta-amounts-to-warcrimes/ [https://perma.cc/T897-888H] (archived Aug. 31, 2020).
Syria War: UN Pleato End 'Hellon Earth'Eastern Ghouta Crisis, BBC NEWS
5.
[https://
(Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-43146042
perma.cc/N9C7-PED2] (archived Aug. 31, 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6.
See S.C. Res. 2401, ¶ 1 (Feb. 24, 2018).
7.
Anders Henriksen & Marc Schack, The Crisis in Syria and Humanitarian
Intervention, 1 J. ON USE OF FORCE & INT'L. L. 122, 122 (2014).
Tamara Qiblawi, More Than 1,000 People Killed in Eastern Ghouta in 2
8.
Weeks, MSF Says, CNN NEWS (Mar. 8, 2018, 7:24 PM), https://www.cnn.coml
[https://
2018/03/08/middleeast/syria-eastern-ghouta-death-toll-soars-intl/index.html
perma.cc/KDL9-JTJ9] (archived Sept. 5, 2020).
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9
symptoms consistent with "exposure to highly toxic chemicals." States

rushed to condemn the attack. The Secretary General added that
"[a]ny confirmed use of chemical weapons, by any party to the conflict
and under any circumstances, is abhorrent and a clear violation of
international law." 10

The United States, France, and the United Kingdom deployed
force against Syria. On April 14, British, French, and US forces
launched upwards of one hundred missiles at a research center in

Damascus and at a weapons storage facility and command post near
Homs. 11 As in 2017, when the United States conducted airstrikes
against Syrian targets following an earlier chemical weapons attack by

Al-Assad, the resulting use of force occurred absent Security Council
approval. Nikki Haley, then the US Ambassador to the UN, claimed
that "when the United Nations consistently fails in its duty to act
collectively, there are times in the life of states that we are compelled
2
to take our own action."1
The international legal response followed a familiar pattern.

Largely, legal scholars agreed that the US-led airstrikes violated
international law. The undertaken military action disregarded the
prohibition on the use of force contained within Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter. 13 A notable number of states, explicitly or implicitly,

condoned the airstrikes as politically necessary and, in select
instances, as legally warranted.14 Legal questions arose, and the

WHO ConcernedAbout Suspected ChemicalAttacks in Syria, WORLD HEALTH
9.
ORG. (Apr. 11, 2018), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2018/chemicalattacks-syria/en/ [https://perma.cc/M4VE-2K92] (archived Sept. 5, 2020).
10.
U.N. Secretary-General, Statement of the Secretary-Generalon Syria, U.N.
(Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2018-04-10/statementsecretary-general-syria [https://perma.cc/K83R-9A6B] (archived Sept. 5, 2020).
Somini Sengupta & Rick Gladstone, Nikki Haley Says U.S. May Take Our
11.
Own Action' on Syrian Chemical Attack, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/05/world/middleeast/syria-chemical-attack-un.html
[https://perma.cc/U82J-52U8] (archived Sept. 5, 2020).
12.
Id.
See Kevin Jon Heller, The Coming Attack on Syria Will be Unlawful, OPINIo
13.
JURIS (Apr. 12, 2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/04/12/the-coming-attack-on-syria-willbe-unlawful/ [https://perma.cc/B346-HDPM] (archived Sept. 5, 2020); see also Marko
Milanovic, The Syria Strikes: Still Clearly Illegal, EJIL: TALK! (Apr. 15, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/5FUKhttps://www.ejiltalk.org/the-syria-strikes-still-clearly-illegal/
5E9J] (archived Sept. 5, 2020); William Partlett, Does It Matter That Strikes Against
Syria
Violate
International
Law?,
PURSUIT
(Apr.
16,
2018),
https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/does-it-matter-that-strikes-against-syriaviolate-international-law [https://perma.cc/B2NK-FUDF] (archived Sept. 5, 2020).
See Alonso Gurmendi Dunkelberg, Rebecca Ingber, Priya Pillai & Elvina
14.
Pothelet, Update:Mapping States'Reactions to the Syria Strikes of April 2018, JUST SEC.
(May 7, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/55790/update-mapping-states-reactions(archived Sept. 5, 2020)
syria-strikes-april-2018/ [https://perma.cc/E3M9-JQ52]
[hereinafter Dunkelberg et al., Mapping Reactions].
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events in Syria became a new episode in an ongoing discourse
regarding the jus ad bellum regime.
Since the formulation of the modern ad bellum framework in 1945,

the accompanying legal discourse has shifted from early doubts
questioning the relevancy and durability of the prohibition on the use
of force. 15 Though some continue to contend that each controversial use
of force further contributes to the prohibition's redundancy, this Article

addresses the contemporary manifestations of the ad bellum debate
that instead consider how best to promote the legitimacy and efficacy

of the Charter-based regime.16 Within these debates, efforts to ensure
against the regime's erosion diverge. Opposing contestations situate
and
camps-minimalists
conceived
broadly
two
between
expansionists. 17 Each grouping covers significant ideological and
the
to
present responses
they
both
grounds;
theoretical

uncontemplated or unaddressed challenges that face the ad bellum
regime when the collective security system fails to meet its founding

ideals.
The minimalist camp believes that strict doctrinal adherence to

the UN Charter's prohibition on the use of force is necessary to ensure
validity and to prevent abuse. Advocates resist departures from, or
expansive readings of, the narrow exceptions to the use of force; they
insist that the four corners of the Charter are fixed. Antithetically, the
expansionist camp holds that the ad bellum regime is threatened by a

schism between the dictates of reality or moral necessity and a
formalist interpretation of the law limiting or prohibiting the use of
force. 18 In contrast to minimalists, expansionists may either posit a
reformist claim that an action occurring beyond acknowledged ad
bellum limits should be permissible or work to bring the proposed
action within the boundaries of legal permissibility by advocating for a
broad conception of where the four corners of the Charter situate.
Issue-specific ad bellum debates that include the use of force against
nonstate actors, around the permissibility of preemptive self-defense,

See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: Changing Norms
15.
Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 836 (1970); see also Louis
Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT'L
L. 544, 545 (1971).
See Jean D'Aspremont, Mapping the Concepts Behind the Contemporary
16.
Liberalizationof the Use of Force in InternationalLaw, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1089, 109091 (2010); see also Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After
Iraq, 97-AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 608 (2003).
17.
These two camps are described in greater detail infra Part II.A.
David Hughes & Yahli Shereshevsky, Something is Not Always Better Than
18.
Nothing: Against a Narrow Threshold Justification for Humanitarian Intervention,
OPINIO JURIS (May 7, 2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/ 05/07/something-is-not-alwaysbetter-than-nothing-against-a-narrow-threshold-justification-for-humanitarianintervention/ [https://perma.cc/4DZM-Q58T] (archived Sept. 5, 2020).
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and concerning the legality of humanitarian intervention reflect this
discursive dichotomy.

form

This Article is about a contemporary shift in the argumentative
that is assumed by the expansionist camp. Prominent

expansionist claims are drifting from the normative foundation that

traditionally

supports

the expansionist

appeal. Three

types of

justifications are identified that are expressive of an emergent "new
expansionist" argumentative form. The first invokes rules-based

justifications that appeal to the Charter regime. Citing the example of
unilateral humanitarian intervention (UHI)-an instance in which a

proposed use of force is not contemplated by the relevant Charter
provisions-this new expansionist argument attempts to frame a

proposed humanitarian action as existing within a traditional use of
force exception. The second exhibits arguments that present narrow or
limited justifications to permit a particular use of force. This is
observed through recent contentions by states and scholars that
support military responses to the use of chemical or biological weapons
(CBWs). These arguments permit the use of force in response to a
specific incident rather than supporting a broad intervention following
a general humanitarian catastrophe. The third features procedural

justifications. These appeals validate ad bellum claims through
expansive invocations of the collective security regime.

This Article suggests that each of the identified forms reflect, and
are constructed to respond to, the prominence of minimalist reasoning
within the international legal discourse regarding the use of force.
These new expansionist arguments attempt to reach broader
audiences by prioritizing those features of their legal claims that are

designed to address prevalent minimalist objections. Each implies that
something-such as a limited right to UHI or the ability to forcefully
respond following the use of a particular weapon-is better than
nothing. This Article ponders the deficiency of this new argumentative

form

and

suggests

that

it

overemphasizes

considerations

of

effectiveness to the detriment of the expansionist camp's principal

appeal-its ability to bridge the gap between the lex lata and the lex
ferenda by providing a moral account of how international law can
respond to the evolving demands of a contemporary international
environment unforeseen upon the establishment of the modern ad
bellum regime.
Emerging expansionist claims, by states and scholars alike,
increasingly prioritize the nonnormative features of their legal

argument. This may facilitate an immediate objective, it may defend
the necessity of a particular use of force, but it raises subsequent
questions about the argument's ramifications. Throughout, this Article

suggests that justifications of expansionist claims that reference
particular circumstances or predetermined criteria, and fail to reflect
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general principles, are imprudent and undermine the legitimacy of the

ad bellum regime. This recalls Alan Buchanan's suggestion that
violations of fundamental rules of existing international law, such as the
prohibition against preventive war and against any use of force that does not
qualify as self-defense and lacks Security Council authorization, are
irresponsible, unless they are accompanied by a sincere effort to construct

superior international legal structures to replace those they damage or render
19
obsolete.

This Article does not suggest that every expansionist claim
include a complete reformist account or provide a full theory of
international law.2 0 Yet good-faith claims that wish to ensure the
efficacy and legitimacy of the ad bellum regime are most effectively
advanced when they reflect the normative allure that distinguishes

expansionist appeals from alternative readings of the jus ad bellum.2 1
New expansionist appeals, described throughout the subsequent Parts,
become maladaptive to their professed purposes if they fail to ground

specific pronouncements in an assessment of how the expansionist
claim promotes a more just conception of international law. To avoid
deviating from the distinctive normative structure that traditionally
informs expansionist claims, the Article suggests that the expansionist
objective-that is rendering the ad bellum system workable-is most
effectively pursued by emphasizing moral considerations while
providing legal assessments. This better situates an ad bellum
response that both exhibits the strengths of expansionist claims and
mollifies the apprehensions shared amongst minimalists.

In so doing, this Article does not assess the legality or wisdom of
any particular ad bellum assertion. Instead, it considers the structure
of the arguments that undergird issue-specific legal claims. Part II
traces the post-war emergence and divergence of the minimalist and
expansionist camps. Despite seemingly contradictory readings of the
UN Charter and the ad bellum regime, this Part positions both camps
as promoting contradictory approaches that are each intended to

achieve a common objective. Here, the Article considers how the ad
bellum debate has evolved and, specifically, how the expansionist camp
has evolved in response to these debates. Part III details contemporary
and emergent manifestations of the resulting discourses. It documents
the increasing prevalence of rules-based, narrow or limited, and

procedural justifications that accompany the use of force. And it

19.

ALLEN BUcHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL

FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 441 (2004).
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARv. L.
20.
REV. 1733, 1746 (1995).
21.
On the importance of such, see, e.g., Andrew Hurrell, Legitimacy and the Use
of Force: Can the Circle Be Squared?, 31 REV. INT'L STUD. 15, 25 (2005).
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describes how these emergent approaches blur the distinction between
two separate notions of legitimacy in a manner that undermines the
expansionist camp's traditional appeal. Part IV responds to these
concerns. It offers a normative account that is intended to reflect the

internal coherence of the expansionist ad bellum claim. Moral
considerations, those appeals that reflect the purported necessity of
force and constitute the normative core of expansionist claims, are
grounded in a standard of global justice. Legal assessments, the
feature of the expansionist claim that describes where the proposed
action fits within the ad bellum framework, articulates a standard of
legal soundness. This does not suggest that an effective expansionist

claim must follow a prescribed formula. Instead, an account is
presented that reemphasizes the purported purposes and priorities

that motivate expansionist claims. Part V concludes.
Divergence from black-letter adherence to the ad bellum regime
will always entail significant costs and present considerable risks. The
strongest justification for incurring these costs and accepting these

risks remains the contention that acceptance is less onerous, less
perilous, than the costs and risks incurred by failing to address the
dictates of reality or the demands of morality. Expansionist arguments

that endeavor to amend the balance between the permissibility and
prohibition of force-to ensure legitimacy, to provide adaptability, to
better defend or more effectively protect-are contingent on their
ability to persuade that deviation is required from something as

sacrosanct as the prohibition on the use of force, must remain grounded
in a strong normative rationale. When attempting to navigate a
dysfunctional ad bellum regime, where realpolitik and the national
interest so often guide international reactions, when the fear of
inaction to an emerging threat or to an ongoing atrocity gives way to
demands for action, it is tempting to preference any legal rationale that

will facilitate a desired response. However, despite these demands and
devoid of a strong, clearly articulated normative basis, something is
not always better than nothing.

II. THE EVOLVING JUS AD BELL UM DEBATE

The modern ad bellum regime disrupted the assumption that war
was an unfettered sovereign right, that war was an unregulated fact of
inter-state relations. From its antecedents in the late nineteenth and

early twentieth centuries, the UN Charter formalized the legal
regulation of force.2 2 Article 2(4), the cornerstone of the contemporary

ad bellum regime, instilled the presumption that uses of force by states

22.

2005).

See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 77-85 (4th ed.
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were prohibited.2 3 Exceptions to the prohibition were delineated. The

Charter restricted the use of force to instances of Security Council
approval under Chapter VII and to the right of individual and

collective self-defense as per Article 51.24 In response to a threat to, or
breach of peace, the Charter empowered the Security Council to
undertake collective security measures that included the use of force.
Notwithstanding the confident rhetoric accompanying this most

comprehensive iteration of the ad bellum regime, the Charter's flaws
were soon identified. The Security Council became associated with
inaction. It failed to facilitate productive relations amongst the major
powers and became subject to Cold War politics and international

apathy. 25 Occurrences of state aggression and instances of Security
Council passivity heralded prognostications of the ad bellum regime's
demise. Ensuing debates considered whether the post-war efforts to
formalize a legal framework governing the use of force maintained
relevancy.26 Article 2(4) would, however, endure. Despite periodic
violations, the norm prohibiting the use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of another state would crystalize
under customary international law, achieve erga omnes status, and
become the definitive tenet of the international order. 27
The ad bellum regime's enduring relevancy did not, however,

equate to confidence in its operationalization. Perceived as
cumbersome and ineffectual, the ad bellum regime was understood as
either too slow or unable to address the evolving nature of conflict and
the emergence of new threats. It was assessed as ill-equipped to

effectively regulate "certain types and instances of recourse to force,
especially in relation to the recourse to force by non-state actors." 28
Despite broad acceptance of the Charter's legitimacy and the
fundamental premise of the ad bellum regime, the legal and political
questions raised by various use of force scenarios caused strain.
Agreement concerning the appropriate recourse remains elusive.
Those committed to the legitimacy of the ad bellum regime diverge on
the necessary means both to ensure the Charter's continued relevancy
and to maintain its objectives of "saving succeeding generations from

23.
U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
24.
U.N. Charter arts. 42, 51.
25.
See Vaughn Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh & Dominik Zaum,
Introduction to THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF
THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945 1, 50 (Vaughn Lowe et al. eds., 2008).
See generally Franck, supra note 15, at 809; see also Jean Combacau, The
26.
Exception of Self-Defence in U.N. Practice, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE
USE OF FORCE 9, 9 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1986).

27.
See Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), Second Phase,
Judgment, 1970 ICJ Rep. 3, ¶ 34 (Feb. 5).
See NOELLE HIGGINS, REGULATING THE USE OF FORCE IN WAR OF NATIONAL
28.
LIBERATION - THE WEED FOR A NEW REGIME: A STUDY OF THE SOUTH MOLUCCAS AND
ACEH 47-48 (2010).
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the scourge of war" and "reaffirm[ing] faith in fundamental human

rights." 29
A. A Schism in the Emergent Ad Bellum Regime
The Charter's aspirational tone, its narrow formulation of the ad
bellum regime, is strained by the worst impulses and perils of the
international community. Famously, Michael Walzer claimed that the
Charter regime's rules-based, positivist conception of the jus ad bellum
constituted a "paper world, which fails at crucial points to correspond
to the world the rest of us still live in."3 0 Emergent threats and modern

challenges now assume alternate forms from those that informed the
post-war establishment of the ad bellum regime. Inter-state combat
has become less common. 3 1 Classification, and thus regulation, of
armed events is more difficult as the line between international and
internal armed conflict blurs. 32 Civil war and decolonization pose
questions concerning the relationship between self-determination and

the use of force. 3 3 The proliferation of transnational terrorist networks
and the prevalence of nonstate armed groups stretch the ad bellum
regime further.
A dichotomy of abandonment and devotion accompanies the
Charter's waning efficacy and the international community's
reiteration of its commitment to the prohibition of the use of force.
Minimalist

and

expansionist

treatments of the jus ad

responses

structure

the

resulting

bellum. Though these approaches differ in

form and substance, adherents to the expansionist and minimalist
camps both endeavor to ensure the effective function of international

law within a deeply conflicted and imperfect world.
In accordance with these categorizations and, as Sir Michael Wood
notes, the ensuing debates regarding shortcomings in the law
governing the use of force often become disputes between what the law

29.

U.N. Charter pmbl.

MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
30.
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS xx-xxi (4th ed. 2006); see also Michael Glennon, The

Limitations of Traditional Rules and Institutions Relating to the Use of Force, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 79, 90-91 (Marc

Weller ed., 2015) [hereinafter Glennon, Limitations of TraditionalRules].
Christine Gray notes that the conflicts between Iran and Iraq; Iraq and
31.
Kuwait; in the Falklands; between Israel and its neighboring states; and between
Eritrea and Ethiopia "were exceptional rather than typical." Christine Gray, The UN
Security System, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR: THE EVOLUTION
OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945 86, 87-88 (Vaughn Lowe, Adam Roberts,

Jennifer Welsh & Dominik Zaum eds., 2008).
32.
Gray notes the conflict in Korea, Vietnam, and the former Yugoslavia as
examples. See id. at 88.
33.
Id.
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is and what the law ought to be. 34 Observers and actors alike ask
whether existing rules-readings

of the Charter's provisions and

corresponding applications of the ad bellum regime-are sufficient to
address contemporary demands or to minimize the wanton use of force.

Of course, engagements with the Charter vary. Uses and users exhibit
diverse motives. A state may wish to ensure a robust conception of
when and under what circumstances force is allowed. 35 Alternatively,

a state or other actor may wish to confine those instances when force
is permissible in accordance with the belief that a strict reading of the
ad bellum architecture advances international stability. 3 6 Alongside
these legal engagements, commentators offer an array of assertions.

These may. be understood, at least in some part, as competing efforts
to ensure the legitimacy of the ad bellum regime.
Tensions between the vision offered by the Charter's drafters and

the demands of a contemporary international society continue to
increase. New norms have developed, and rules and exceptions have
been asserted. While several norms are fixed and provide certainty,
many more exist in constant flux, their status uncertain or contested.
Monica Hakimi and Jacob Katz Cogan note that, in certain instances,

the uses of force "that stray from these norms are still perceived to be
unlawful, but such operations might be tolerated or even supported in
practice." 3 7 Other norms, "are highly contested. These norms'

substantive content is so openly and heatedly debated that the
38
credibility of the entire regime has been called into question."
The accompanying debates assume varied forms. Our division of
the ad bellum debate between minimalists and expansionists is but one
of several articulations of the continuing discourse regarding the law

that governs the use of force. Alongside substantive differences, the
core of these debates exhibit contrasting conceptions of international
law's purpose and function. Scholars have presented various
categorizations of these opposing perspectives. Hakimi and Cogen

34.
See Michael Wood, InternationalLaw and the Use of Force: What Happens in
Practice?, 53 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 345, 354 (2013).
Perhaps the most expansive reading of the UN Charter was contained within
35.
the U.S. 2002 National Security Strategy's interpretation of the imminence requirement.
See WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA 14-15 (2002), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf
(last visited Sept. 5, 2020) [https://perma.cc/P7QS-QXK6] (archived Sept. 5, 2020).
For example, see the formal position of the Non-Aligned Movement in relation
36.
to questions concerning the existence of a norm favoring humanitarian intervention and

the expansiveness of the self-defense criteria. See Comments of the Non-Aligned
Movement on the Observations and Recommendations Contained in the Report of the
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ¶j 14-15, 23-24, U.N. Doc.
A/59/565 (Feb. 28, 2005).
Monica Hakimi & Jacob Katz Cogan, The Two Codes on the Use of Force, 27
37.
EUR. J. INT'L. L. 257, 257 (2016).
Id.
38.
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identify "two codes" that stem from the Charter but each possess their
own procedural and substantive norms. The "institutional code"
promotes a strict limitation on the use of force. It is emblematic of the
structured and collective decision-making processes of international
institutions in which the Security Council is the preferred arbiter. The

"state code" favors a horizontal decision-making process through which
states offer ad hoc responses to specific cases. Permissive norms are
elevated as part of efforts to deregulate the use of force. 3 9
Substantive debates regarding the permissibility of force may also

be understood as methodological disputes. 40 These occur between what
Olivier Corten dubs the extensive and the restrictive approaches.4 1
Adherents to the extensive approach interpret ad bellum rules "in the
most flexible manner possible: in this way, doctrines such as
'preventive self-defense', the 'implicit authorisation' of the Security
Council, or the right of 'humanitarian intervention', for example, can

be accepted as conforming to the rules." 42 Proponents of the restrictive
approach favor a "much stricter interpretation of the prohibition,
making it much less likely that new exceptions will be viewed as

acceptable." 4 3 The result, as Corten explains, is a methodological
divide. Opposing conceptions of legitimacy undergird the competing ad
bellum assertions. The extensive approach "assumes that moral and
other non-legal considerations will be taken into account, and
emphasizes the practice of major states, which are considered better
able to satisfy the demand of legitimacy and effectiveness."4 4 The
restrictive approach
denounces this method as subjective, even ideological, preferring instead to insist
on the necessity of differentiating law from politics or morality. From this
perspective, the customary rule outlawing the use of force can evolve only by
means of the intentional acceptance of the international community of states as
a whole, the prohibition on the use of force being considered as a foundational
45
rule of international public order.

This dichotomy may be further extended. Following the Cold War,
political bipolarity eased and the Security Council reengaged in legal

39.
Id. at 258.
40.
See generally Olivier Corten, The Controversies over the Customary
Prohibitionon the Use of Force: A Methodological Debate, 16 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 803 (2005)
[hereinafter Corten, Controversiesover the Customary Prohibition].
41.
Id. at 804.
42.
Id. at 803.
43.
Corten contrasts the works of Thomas Franck and Christine Gray as
representative of these diverging approaches. See id. at 804. See generally THOMAS M.
FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTIONS AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS
(2002) [hereinafter FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE]; CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (Malcolm Evans & Phoebe Okowa eds., 2000).

44.

Corten, Controversiesover the Customary Prohibition,supra note 40, at 821.

45.

Id. at 821-22.
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debates concerning the use of force. An ensuing discourse, Matthew
46
Waxman explains, emerged between "bright-liners" and "balancers."

The permissibility of a particular use of force-one that extends beyond
a black-letter reading of the Charter-is either dismissed by brightliners who promote rigid and codified rules or (potentially) advocated
47
for by the balancers who espouse context-adaptive standards. In so
doing, the bright-liners employ a restrictive methodology. This is
grounded in existing texts and uncontroversial doctrine. It draws upon
"clear manifestations of universal opinio juris" to support a rigorous
reading of the Charter. 48 In contrast, balancers preference an

integrative approach that bends law, practice, and values to find
instances that justify the authorization of a particular use of force that

has been deemed necessary.4 9
These dyadic understandings of contemporary ad bellum debates
emphasize divergent conceptions of legal methodology and doctrine.
Our preferred grouping of the expansionist and minimalist approaches

accentuates the role that legitimacy assumes within each camp. As
these debates manifest, each camp offers a contrasting interpretation

of the Charter's limits. They contest whether the four corners of the
Charter are narrowly fixed or broadly conceived.
Minimalists acknowledge that a strict reading of Charter-based
exceptions discounts instances where the use of force may otherwise
appear necessary. Legitimacy, they assert, will be eroded through the
exploitation of an alternative, more flexible, regime that facilitates
state overreach. A minimalist reading of the relevant Charter

provisions is therefore the surest way to preserve the system's
legitimacy and protect against the dangers of excess.

Expansionists too endeavor to ensure the ad bellum regime's
legitimacy. They, however, diverge on the means by which this is
achieved. The expansionist camp is joined by the belief that legitimacy
is compromised by interpretations of international law that prohibit
uses of force when it is otherwise compelled by the demands of morality
or necessity. The ad bellum regime, the expansionist suggests, should
gradually develop to meet evolving circumstances. This belief conjoins
the expansionist camp which otherwise expresses disparate views
concerning Charter rules. In certain cases, most notably in relation to
UHI, expansionists acknowledge that their endorsement of the
protective use of force is beyond the Charter's limits. More often, such
as in relation to the unwilling or unable doctrine, expansionists present

Matthew C. Waxman, Regulating Resort to Force: Form and Substance of the
46.
UN Charter Regime, 24 EUR. J. INT'L L. 151, 155 (2013).
47.
Id.
See Olivier Corten, Regulating Resort to Force: A Response to Matthew
48.
Waxman from a 'Bright-Liner',24 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 191, 191-92 (2013).
Id. at 192.
49.
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interpretative positions that stretch the boundaries of the Charter

through justifications that portend to reflect the dictates of reality.
In this sense, the contributions of both camps are distinguishable
from the more critical strands of reasoning that hold that the ad bellum
regime is inherently flawed, that it facilitates rather than constrains
the use of force by states. 50 Instead, expansionists and minimalists
acknowledge the deficiencies in the ad bellum regime while striving to

ensure that the regime functions effectively. They recognize the
challenges, the novel threats, and the unanticipated scenarios that
muddy contemporary legal debates regarding the use of force. A
minimalist approach that assesses the permissibility of a particular
use of force, that navigates the ad bellum regime's indeterminacy or
incompleteness, understands that legal claims "will only be accepted
as legitimate if they are based, methodologically speaking, on a
reference to the relevant legal rule as it appears in the formal
sources." 5 1 With similar purpose, but through divergent methods,

expansionist approaches move beyond a strict reading of the Charter
to suggest that a necessary use of force derives legitimacy "from the
facts and circumstances that the States believe made it necessary." 52
B. Internal Coherence within the Evolving Ad Bellum Discourse

What is broadly categorized here as expansionist arguments have,
since the earliest manifestations of these ad bellum debates, exhibited
an internal argumentative logic. Particular legal appeals are presented
in response to the perception that a gap exists between how the
Charter's drafters envisioned the international legal system and the
realities that followed the establishment of the post-war ad bellum
regime. Though its responses to contemporary challenges and debates
concerning the use of force vary, the expansionist camp coalesces
around the belief that the ad bellum regime's legitimacy is contingent
upon bridging this gap. Accordingly, the traditional commencement of
the expansionist contribution features substantive normative
arguments. These normative appeals are most persuasive when they

are grounded in a moral account. They are most convincing when they

See Dawood I. Ahmed, Defending Weak States Against the "Unwilling or
50.
Unable"Doctrineof Self-Defense, 9 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 1, 24 (2013); Ntina Tzouvala,
TWAIL and the "Unwillingor Unable"Doctrine: Continuities and Ruptures, 109 AM. J.
INT'L L. UNBOUND 266, 270 (2017), https://www.cambridge.org/core/ journals/americanjournal-of-international-law/article/twail-and-the-unwilling-or-unable-doctrine-continu

ities-and-ruptures/D6F783C5A82C8F5CB3661929C9E4220A
(last visited Sept. 20,
2020) [https://perma.cc/4HQU-E546] (archived Sept. 20, 2020). See generally DAVID
KENNEDY,

OF WAR AND

LAw (2006).

Corten, Controversies over the Customary Prohibition,supranote 40, at 815.
51.
52.
William H. Taft IV & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq and International
Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L. L. 557, 557 (2003); see also Corten, Controversies over the
Customary Prohibition,supra note 40, at 805.
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present coherent, compelling, and overarching rationales of why force
is a necessary response to a particular circumstance that would

otherwise be deemed beyond the allowances provided by a formalist
reading of the UN Charter.
The normative foundation of this core expansionist claim divides
between distinct fields of ad bellum arguments concerning: the use of

force in self-defense, the use of force to protect others, and collective
security. This Article focuses on the latter two considerations.
Expansionist accounts of the jus ad bellum push the law towards what

proponents frame as a reasonableness or common-sense standard
grounded in a basic appeal to morality. 53 These arguments share the
assertion that within a nonideal world, uncontemplated or unknown
upon the Charter's drafting, contemporary events compel expansive
understandings of permissibility.
Events in South-Eastern Europe renewed constitutive features of
the issue-specific ad bellum debates that now dominate contemporary
scholarship and discourse. NATO's Kosovo campaign posed various
questions regarding the scope and purposes of Article 2(4) and the ad
bellum regime. 54 In the General Assembly and at the Security Council,

states contested whether NATO's actions evidenced an emerging
humanitarian exception to the use of force prohibition or amounted to
a direct violation of the UN Charter. 55 NATO had amended its strategic
purpose prior to the intervention. Previously limited to collective

defense, the alliance would move to ensure that the Balkans were "free
from violence and instability" and would work to build "security,

prosperity and democratic civil society. 5 6

The justification that accompanied the resulting military
intervention would not, however, directly invoke a humanitarian

exception. Instead, NATO members presented a series of moral and
political appeals that did not include an explicit legal claim. 57 The
resulting events placed the question of humanitarian intervention, and
auxiliary ad bellum discussions, at the forefront of international legal
discourse. The decision of a majority of NATO members to opt against
formalizing what amounted to an expansionist ad bellum action

53.

This is documented in greater detail below. See infra Part III.

See, e.g., GRAY, supra note 43, at 31-32.
54.
55.
Id.
56.
See Press Release, Heads of State and Government Participating in the
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, An Alliance for the 21st Century, NAC-S (99)64
(Apr. 24, 1999), https://www.nato.int/doculpr/1999/p99-064e.htm (last visited Sept. 20,
2020) [https://perma.cc/66KR-XNM8] (archived Sept. 20, 2020); see also GRAY, supranote
43, at 40.
57.
GRAY, supra note 43, at 40; see also Press Release, NATO, Statement by the
North
Atlantic
Council
on
Kosovo,
PR
(99)12
(Jan.
30,
1999),
2020)
20,
(last visited Sept.
https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-012e.htm
[https://perma.cc/FGC4-744Y] (archived Sept. 20, 2020).
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created uncertainty.5 8 Michael Matheson, then the State Department's
Legal Advisor, recalled that
we listed all the reasons why we were taking action and, in the end, mumbled
something about it being justifiable and legitimate but not a precedent. So in a
sense, it was something less than a definitive legal rationale-although it
probably was taken by large parts of the public community as something like
that.

59

Yugoslavia proceeded to petition the International

Court of

Justice. Claiming that ten NATO members had breached the use of
force prohibition

and violated Yugoslav sovereignty,

officials in

Belgrade disputed the legal status of humanitarian intervention. 60 The
majority of NATO states would still not formally engage in the ad
bellum debate. 61 Belgium, however, provided a full legal justification

of the NATO decision to use force. 6 2 A moral justification served as the
foundation for an expansionist ad bellum claim. The intervention was,
Belgium submitted, an effort to "protect fundamental values enshrined
in the jus cogens and to prevent an impending catastrophe recognized
as such by the Security Council." 6 3 The threat to peace and security
were referenced and forwarded alongside accounts of the unfolding
atrocities. Moral assertions were grounded in a series of Security
Council resolutions and recalled legal precedents. Collectively, these
factors were said to evidence the Belgian claim that the undertaken
humanitarian intervention was compatible with an evolving reading of

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 64
Belgium's legal response situates

alongside a tradition

of

expansionist appeals. It provides a coherent argumentative structure

that reflects the expansionist belief that the ad bellum regime's
legitimacy is contingent upon reducing the gap between a strict
reading of the Charter and the exigencies of a contemporary event that
compels international attention. Variants of this expansionist
approach have long been favored by states (both in form and in

substance). Predictable results followed. A litany of engagements, often

GRAY, supra note 43, at 41.
58.
MICHAEL P. ScHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES
59.
OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL

ADVISER 125 (2010).
See Memorial of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Legality of Use of Force
60.
(Yugoslavia v. Belg.), 2000 I.C.J. Pleadings 303-04 (Jan. 5, 2000); see also GRAY, supra
note 43, at 44.
GRAY, supra note 43, at 45.
61.
See Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg.), Verbatim Record, ¶ 11 (May
62.
10, 1999, 3 p.m.), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/105/105-19990510ORA-02-01-BI.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2020) [https://perma.cc/D8CP-RELG] (archived
Dec. 21, 2020).
63.
Id. ¶¶ 11-12.
64.
Id. ¶ 12.
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forwarded by powerful states, gradually broadened the conditions in
65
Purportedly
which the use of force was claimed as permissible.
humanitarian justifications were understood as a means to extend
narrow state interests. 6 6 To protect against overreach, to safeguard
from abuse, a preponderance of international lawyers offer minimalist
responses to expansionist claims.

The minimalist camp suggests that the language of
reasonableness or sensibleness risks becoming apologetic. It
contributes to a vague legal regime, defined by indeterminacy and
susceptible to state manipulation. Proponents of the expansionist camp
acknowledge the tension between the provision of what they consider
to be the latitude necessary to address emerging needs and the
potential that states may abuse this latitude. In response, the
expansionist camp articulates conditions that purport to restrict

potential

abuse.

These measures become

a means to address

minimalist concerns. It is, of course, necessary to engage with one's

detractors. However, a series of recent expansionist ad bellum appeals
exhibit the potential shortcomings of emphasizing a response to the
minimalist critique rather than establishing the normative
foundations of the expansionist claim. As these argumentative
structures manifest through issue-specific ad bellum debates, more

recent iterations of the expansionist appeal have subtly shifted to
increasingly display a novel argumentative form.

III. THE EMERGING EXPANSIONIST FORM

Considerations of an argument's utility, its expediency, and its
efficacy reveal much about the purpose and function of international
law. Recently, prominent expansionist offerings have drifted from their
traditional normative structure. These new expansionist appeals-

that profess to better maintain the legitimacy of a workable ad bellum
regime-have begun to favor assessments of effectiveness over
normative articulations. They prioritize responses to minimalist
concerns while relegating the need to adhere to the traditional
expansionist argumentative form. As the following sections

demonstrate, within contemporary debates regarding the use of force,
this evolving expansionist form preferences legal appeals that provide

rules-based justifications that appeal to the Charter, express a narrow
or limited justification, and/or forward a procedural justification. By
abandoning or deemphasizing the expansionist camp's internal
normative logic, this emergent argumentative form risks becoming

See generally D'Aspremont, supra note 16.
65.
See generally ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL
66.
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2011).

AUTHORITY
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myopic or ad hoc. These arguments neglect or relegate what should be,
and traditionally has been, the principal evaluative criterion of the
expansionist camp-its ability to offer a compelling normative

argument that bridges the lex lata and the lex ferenda through legal
appeals that respond to shifting realities and the corresponding need
to act in self-defense or in the defense of others.
A. Rules-Based Justificationsthat Appeal to the UN Charter: The
Case of HumanitarianIntervention
The distance between the expansionist and formalist camps is
greatest in relation to the

question of unilateral humanitarian

intervention (UHI). Debates accompanying various military forays-in
the Balkans, Sierra Leone, Libya, and Syria-offer a blend of legal,
moral, political, and pragmatic appeals. The ensuing discourse has
become the paradigmatic example of ad bellum considerations that
assess the appropriateness of the use of force as a means to defend
others. These debates are set against an unforgiving backdrop.
Instances of genocide and mass atrocities, as Alex Bellamy tells, end
either when the perpetrator succeeds or is forcibly prevented from
continuing to kill.6 7 The resulting debates regarding the legality and

suitability of UHI commonly occur beyond the four corners of the UN
Charter. Adjacent ad bellum debates, those concerning the use of force
against nonstate actors or in preemptive self-defense, dispute the
allowances that Charter formulations permit. 68 These expansionist
appeals attempt to pacify minimalist concerns by assuring opponents
that permissive readings remain grounded in an established use of

force exception. Such parallels usually do not extend to the case of
UHI. 69 Accordingly, with the elevation of state interest, the potential

for the abuse of a vague legal regime is greater than in instances when
(expansive) state actions are grounded in the Charter.
The moral case for UHI is nevertheless compelling. Good faith
appeals to a norm permitting the use of force in the defense of others

&

Alex J. Bellamy, The Changing Face of HumanitarianIntervention, 11 ST.
67.
ANTONY'S INT'L REV. 15, 17 (2015).
68.
See generally Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual
Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM. J. INT'L. L. 769 (2012); Jutta Brunn6e
Stephen Toope, Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors: Are Powerful States Willing but
Unable to Change International Law?, 67 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 263 (2018); Amos N.
Guiora, Anticipatory Self-Defence and International Law - A Re-Evaluation, 13 J.
CONFLIcT & SEcURITY L. 3 (2008); Kimberley N. Trapp, Back to Basics: Necessity,
Proportionality,and the Right to Self-Defence Against Non-State Terrorist Actors, 56
INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 141 (2007); Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive SelfDefense, 50 VILL. L. REV. 699 (2005).
Nico Krisch, Legality, Morality, and the Dilemma of Humanitarian
69.
Intervention after Kosovo, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 323, 325-26 (2002) [hereinafter Krisch,
HumanitarianIntervention].
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promises to alleviate the most horrific occurrences of human suffering.
It compels fervent debate that spreads through emotive pleas that
move the general public and the international community alike.
Furthermore, moral deliberations, international criminal law, and the

domestic regulation of the individual use of force all accept the defense
of others as a permissible exception that parallels self-defense
allowances. 70 Yet proponents of UHI are unable to ground their
expansionist ad bellum appeal in language derived from the Charter.
As Kevin Jon Heller details, the drafting history of Article 2(4)
explicitly conveys that the prohibition on the use of force is without
exception but for those permissions contained within the Charter
itself.7 1 Continuing, Heller reminds that UHI fails to find the required
legal exemption. 72 Definitionally, UHI is unauthorized by the Security

Council, it occurs absent the consent of the territorial state, and it does
73
not follow an armed attack against the state using force.
As with additional use of force debates, the opposing camps

contest the legitimacy and relevancy of the ad bellum regime. The
formalist camp emphasizes that the Charter does not contain any basis
to support UHI. Its proponents accentuate the risk of abuse-both
historical and contemporary-by states pursuing self-interest under
the guise of humanitarian values. 74 Expansionist appeals accentuate
the gravity of the triggering atrocity. Louis Henkin, for example,
begins by establishing the emotive facts of the Kosovo case-citing
massive human rights violations, the commission of crimes against
75
humanity, and instances of genocide-as the basis for intervention.
By elevating morality-based considerations above what they frame as
an unworkable reading of international law that unduly prioritizes
anachronistic conceptions of sovereignty and order, expansionists

appeal to the post-Holocaust pledge of "never again" and the moral
76
These arguments
imperatives that compel intervention.

depart

70.
See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 31(1)(C), July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3; SUZANNE UNIACKE, PERMISSIBLE KILLING 47 (1996); Seth
Lazar, Just War Theory: Revisionists Versus Traditionalists,20 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 37,
46 (2017).
Kevin Jon Heller, The Illegality of 'Genuine' Unilateral Humanitarian
71.
Intervention 2 (Amsterdam Law School, Research Paper No. 48, 2019),
[https://
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3492412&download=yes
perma.cc/UL4U-CE4P] (archived Aug. 30, 2020); see also SEAN D. MURPHY,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER

71-72 (1996).
Heller, supra note 71, at 2.
72.
73.
Id.
74.

See Ryan Goodman, HumanitarianIntervention and the Pretexts for War, 100

AM. J. INT'L L. 107, 112-13 (2006) (describing the resistance to UHI).
See Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of HumanitarianIntervention, 93 AM.
75.
J. INT'L. L. 824, 826-28 (1999) [hereinafter Henkin, Kosovo].
76.
See Krisch, HumanitarianIntervention, supra note 69, at 327; see also Martti
Koskenniemi, 'The Lady Doth Protest Too Much: Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in
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significantly from black-letter legal claims. Instead, UHI's most
influential endorsements provide lex ferenda appeals that reflect the
gravity of the underlying atrocity, the necessity of intervention, and

the belief that the use of force constitutes a last resort. 77
Informed by the Kosovo fact pattern and now inspired by atrocities
in the Levant, the new expansionist approach endeavors to appease the

minimalist camp's enduring apprehensions. Though the Kosovo case
raised the prospect of the normative and legal recognition of UHI,
interventions in Iraq and Libya cast a long shadow upon military
undertakings that offered humanitarian overtures and promised to

produce local transformation and global stability. 78 Subsequently, the
minimalist position has been widely embraced by the international
legal community. 79 The first form of the new expansionist argument

must contend with an unwelcome empirical record. In response to
prominent

minimalist

concerns,

proponents

of an

expansionist

approach increasingly offer rules-based justifications that purport to
limit and guide a proposed UHI by employing a vernacular that
resembles existing legal regulations contained within the UN Charter.
In 2013, British Prime Minister David Cameron proposed to

Parliament that the United Kingdom join the United States and
80
consider military action in response to Syrian atrocities. In support

of the proposed action, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)
provided a detailed legal analysis of UHI.81 This traced a similar
argumentative line that UK officials had presented in support of NATO
action in Kosovo and when imposing a no-fly zone in Iraq during the

InternationalLaw, 65 MOD. L. REV. 159, 171 (2002); W. Michael Reisman, Kosovo's
Antinomies, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 860, 861-62 (1999).
See W. Michael Reisman & Myres McDougal, HumanitarianIntervention to
77.
Protect the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 173

(Richard Lillich ed., 1973); see also NIKOLAOS K. TSAGOURIAS, JURISPRUDENcE

OF

INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE HUMANITARIAN DIMENSION 98-100 (2000); NIcHOLAS J.
WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL

SOcIETY 51 (2000). Some proponents of UHI do, however, claim that the use of force for
humanitarian purposes has received status through customary international law or that
it constitutes an expansive form of self-defense. See, e.g., FERNANDO R. TESON,
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY 67 (3d. ed. 2005);

Jens David Ohlin, The Doctrine of Legitimate Defense, 91 INT'L L. STUD. 119, 140-41
(2015).
See Benjamin A. Valentino, The True Costs of HumanitarianIntervention, 90
78.
FOREIGN AFF. 60, 62 (2011).
79.
Milanovic, supranote 13.
Nicholas Watt & Rowena Mason, David Cameron Recalls Parliament over
80.
Syria Crisis, GUARDIAN (Aug. 27, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/
aug/27/david-cameron-recalls-parliament-syria [https://perma.cc/5G3F-P85C] (archived
Sept. 3, 2020].
81.
29
Aug.
2013,
Parl
Deb
HC
(2013)
col.
1425
(UK),
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm20l314/cmhansrd/cml3O829/debtext/1308290001.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9WZJ-55JT] (archived Sept. 3,
2020).
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1990s. 82 The FCO contended that if the Security Council is unable to
act, international law permits the use of exceptional measures to avert
a humanitarian catastrophe if
(i) there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international
community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale,
requiring immediate relief; (ii) it must be objectively clear that there is no
practicable alternative to the use of force if lives are to be saved; and (iii) the
proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief of
83
humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in time and scope to this aim.

The British employ an argumentative technique that supposes
legality in instances when a proposed UHI satisfies predetermined
84
criteria. This aligns with what Ashley Deeks terms multipart tests.
When Security Council authorization is unlikely, safeguards and tests
are employed to "structure and assess state uses of force in
nontraditional contexts." 85 The British application of evaluative
factors maintains consistency with traditional expansionist appeals.
By requiring evidence of extreme humanitarian distress that demands
immediate relief, the FCO's articulation ensures the expansionist
camp's normative structure. However, Deeks emphasizes that the
efficacy of a multipart test is contingent on its ability both to limit the
discretion provided to the state intending to use force and the test's
86
ability to track the Charter or a customary ad bellum rule. This

assessment drifts from the normative appeals to gravity and necessity
87
It reflects an
that have structured past expansionist contentions.
foregrounds
camp
that
increasing reprioritization by the expansionist

considerations of effectiveness and prioritizes the ability to appease
minimalist concerns by anchoring expansionist claims in an appeal to
the rule of law that reflects Charter conditions.
The protagonist of this emergent expansionist approach, Harold
Koh, articulates a six-part test that is positioned as both narrower and
wider than conventional expansionist endorsements of UHI

82.
John Bellinger, The UK Legal Position on Humanitarian Intervention in
Syria: Kosovo Redux, LAWFARE (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.lawfareblog.com/uk-legal[https://perma.cc/3U6T-5PFU]
position-humanitarian-intervention-syria-kosovo-redux
(archived Sept. 3, 2020).
U.K. FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, FURTHER SUPPLEMENTARY
83.
WRITTEN EVIDENCE FROM THE RT. HON. HUGH ROBERTSON MP, MINISTER OF STATE:
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTEcT, Jan. 14, 2014,
Annex A.

See generally Ashley Deeks, Multi-PartTests in the Jus Ad Bellum, 53 HOUS.
84.
L. REV. 1035 (2016).
Id. at 1035.
85.
Id. at 1061.
86.
See Nigel S. Rodley, 'HumanitarianIntervention', in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
87.
OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 775, 788-91 (Marc Weller ed., 2015); see
also WHEELER, supra note 77, at 35.
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(1) If a humanitarian crisis creates consequences significantly disruptive of
international order-including proliferation of chemical weapons, massive
refugee outflows, and events destabilizing to regional peace and security-that
would likely soon create an imminent threat to the acting nations (which would
give rise to an urgent need to act in individual and collective self-defense under
U.N. Charter Article 51);
(2) a Security Council resolution were not available because of persistent veto;
and the group of nations that had persistently sought Security Council action
had exhausted all other remedies reasonably available under the circumstances,
they would not violate U.N. Charter Article 2(4) if they used
(3) limited force for genuinely humanitarianpurposes that was necessary and
proportionate to address the imminent threat, would demonstrably improve the
humanitarian situation, and would terminate as soon as the threat is abated. In
particular, these nations' claim that their actions were not wrongful would be
strengthened if they could demonstrate:
(4) that the action was collective, e.g., involving the General Assembly's Uniting
for Peace Resolution or regional arrangements under U.N. Charter Chapter VIII;
(5) that collective action would prevent the use of a per se illegal means by the
territorial state, e.g., deployment of banned chemical weapons; or
(6) would help to avoid a per se illegal end, e.g., genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, or an avertable humanitarian disaster, such as the
widespread slaughter of innocent civilians, for example, another Halabja or
Srebrenica. 8 8

Koh's proposed criteria diverge from the traditional justifications
and tests that supplement endorsements of UHI. 89 Gravity, so often
the cornerstone of the expansionist appeal, goes unmentioned. Where
the United Kingdom began its justificatory approach by demonstrating

"extreme humanitarian distress," Koh prioritizes the requirement that
the humanitarian crisis creates a situation of imminent threat to the

acting state. 90 Koh links the proposed UHI to the Charter exception of
individual and collective self-defense. This unorthodox approach fails

to establish a satisfactory nexus between considerations of self-defense
and the normative reasoning that would (potentially) support UHI.
The suggested requirements of international disruption and a
(perceived) threat to the intervening state(s) risk facilitating claims

that are more self-interested than humanitarian. The principle of
political neutrality-the establishing criterion often presented to limit
state misuse-is rendered meaningless by an argumentative structure

88.
Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and HumanitarianIntervention, 53
HOUS. L. REV. 971, 1011 (2016) (emphasis omitted).
For a critical account of Koh's position along similar lines, see generally
89.
Kimberley N. Trapp, Unauthorized Military Interventions for the Public Good: A
Response to Harold Koh, 111 AM. J. INT'L L. UNBOUND 292 (2017).
90.
Koh, supra note 88, at 1011.
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that replaces the requirement of impartiality with an appeal to direct
benefit.9 1
Koh attempts to bridge the gap between Charter exceptions and
UHI. Perhaps motivated by the sense that something is better than
nothing and a desire to limit the instances when the expansive use of
force is permissible, Koh's account amounts to a good faith promotion
of humanitarian values. However, features of the proposed criteria
undermine the internal logic of the expansionist approach. If
considerations of gravity and impartiality provide normative weight, if

they persuasively establish the necessity of responding to an ongoing
atrocity, then imposing a criterion that elevates the narrow interests
of, or the perceived threat to, the intervening state is irrelevant. Koh's

approach gives undue weight to explanations that tell of why a state
elects to intervene in a specific case despite a general reluctance to do
so. The desire to impose limiting criteria provides a sensible means to
address minimalist apprehensions. It may even be empirically
warranted. However, Koh's failure to require support of the proposed
intervention through normative justification undermines expansionist
coherence. It is difficult to imagine a plausible argument, distinct from
a separate Article 51 justification, which allows humanitarian
intervention in response to genocide only if the motivating atrocity also
poses an imminent threat to the intervening state. Though such
well-established
the
accommodate
to
attempts
reasoning
logic, moral
the
internal
apprehensions of detractors, abandoning
appeal, and normative strength of the expansionist form risks
exacerbating, not allaying, minimalist concerns.
Koh's proposed criteria further exhibits features of the new
supplementary
fifth
criterion-the
The
form.
expansionist
use of a per se
the
would
prevent
requirement that collective action

illegal means by the territorial state-such as the deployment of
92
chemical weapons-is increasingly featured in expansionist appeals.
These narrow or limited justifications commonly undergird the
arguments offered by states and scholars in support of using force in
scenarios that purportedly blend humanitarian and defensive

considerations.
B. Narrow or Limited Justifications:The Case of a Chemical Weapons
Exception
Narrow or limited justifications respond to minimalist concerns by
reducing the scope of an expansionist appeal. The proposed use of force
is offered as a reply to an exceptional event that can be qualitatively

determined. Accordingly, expansionists contend that such a narrow or

91.
92.

See, e.g., Rodley, supra note 87, at 798.
Koh, supra note 88, at 1011.
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limited reading of the jus ad bellum facilitates a necessary course of
action while reducing the indeterminacy accompanying those broader

justifications that remain susceptible to overreach. Such reasoning is
most prevalent in response to the use of chemical or biological weapons
by a dictatorial regime. Narrow or limited justifications feature

prominently within the reasoning provided by those states that used
force following the deployment of chemical weapons by Syria in 2018.
This form of reasoning was again displayed by the additional states

that, explicitly or implicitly, supported the offensive action as an
acceptable response following the use of CBWs.
States increasingly find such form of reasoning appealing. Narrow
or limited justifications-such

as the determination

of a CBW

threshold-allow the state to pursue a strategic objective in select
instances but abstain from acting in other events that may exhibit
greater moral urgency but provide weaker incentives to engage. Al-

Assad's use of chemical weapons evoked diverse state responses. 93
However, in contrast to previous state endorsements of UHI, those

nations that expressed legal or political support for the US, British,
94
and French airstrikes offered narrow justifications.
The United Kingdom was the first of the three states that recently
intervened in Syria to provide legal reasoning. The United Kingdom
initially

maintained

its

gravity-based

approach.

Recalling

the

justificatory structure that has undergirded its past, purportedly,
humanitarian initiatives and that reflects the traditional expansionist
form, British officials reiterated their 2013 rationale. 9 5 Legality was

premised upon the state's ability to provide evidence of humanitarian
distress, to illustrate the absence of alternative measures, and to
demonstrate the necessary, proportionate, and limited application of
force. Now, however, the British departed from the encompassing
notion of gravity that accompanied their decision to use force in
Kosovo. British officials cited the more limited use of chemical weapons
in satisfaction of the test's gravity criterion. Their legal reasoning held
that "military intervention . . . in order effectively to alleviate
humanitarian distress by degrading the Syrian regime's chemical

weapons capability and deterring further chemical weapons attacks
96
was necessary and proportionate and therefore legally justifiable."
While the British justification began by appealing to the gravity
of the Syrian crisis, its turn to the specific use of CBWs was

accentuated by other states. In its statement to the Security Council,

Dunkelberg et al., Mapping Reactions, supra note 14.
93.
94.
See id.
95.
PRIME MINISTER's OFFICE, Syria Action - UK Government Legal Position,
U.K. Gov'T (Apr. 14, 2018), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/syria-action(last visited
uk-government-legal-position/syria-action-uk-government-legal-position
Sept. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/AVL6-MZ49] (archived Sept. 20, 2020).
96.
Id.
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France noted Syria's disregard for basic humanitarian principles. After

citing the scope of the catastrophe, France shifted emphasis. Its
Permanent Representative to the UN recalled that "the Syrian regime
has been using the most terrifying weapons of mass destructionits
civilian
and terrorize
weapons-to
massacre
chemical
population." 97 This focus on the use of chemical weapons prioritized
strategic interest above gravity-based humanitarian considerations.
France declared that the use of such weapons constituted a threshold
of which violation could not be tolerated. In response to the deployment
of CBWs, the Syrian operation was described as compliant with the UN
Charter. France noted that military action "was developed within a
proportionate framework, restricted to specific objectives . . . Syria's
capacity to develop, refine, and manufacture chemical weapons has
been rendered inoperative. That was the only goal and it was
achieved." 98
The United States did not provide a formal legal justification.
However, US officials have linked the legality of the airstrikes with a

requirement to stem the proliferation of CBWs. Then Secretary of
Defense Mattis told a press briefing that "we worked together to
maintain the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. We did what
we believe was right under international law, under our nation's

laws." 99 US officials were clear that the humanitarian character of the
military response and the accompanying rhetoric were subsidiary
considerations. Principally, the airstrikes were a demonstration of
"international resolve" to prevent future uses of chemical weapons in
an unstable region of the world. 100
Qualified support of the attack was forthcoming from several

states whose responses ranged from indirect legal acquiescence to
direct political endorsement.101 Numerous states premised their (often

Frangois Delattre, Syria - Speech by the Permanent Representative of France
97.
to the United Nations - Security Council (Apr. 14, 2018), https://id.ambafrance.org/
(last
Syria-Speech-by-the-Permanent-Representative-of-France-to-the-United-Nations
visited Sept. 5, 2020) [https://perma.cc/YG5J-U3X8] (archived Sept. 5, 2020).
98.
Id. (emphasis added).
99.
Helene Cooper, Mattis Wanted CongressionalApproval Before Striking Syria.
He Was Overruled., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/17/
us/politics/jim-mattis-trump-syria-attack.html [https://perma.cc/72EB-V62M] (archived
Sept. 5, 2020).
100. Press Release, Dep't of Def., Statement by Secretary James N. Mattis on Syria
https://www.defense.gov/DesktopModules/ArticleCS[Print.aspx?
13,
2018),
(Apr.
PortalId=1&ModuleId=764&Article=1493610 [https://perma.cc/QV2Q-4GSB] (archived
Sept. 5, 2020).
101.

There were, of course, numerous states that objected to the airstrikes on the

grounds that they directly violated the prohibition on the use of force contained with
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. See, e.g., Media Statement, Ministry of Int'l Relations
and Cooperation, Namibia Concerned About the Situation in Syria (Apr. 16, 2018), http://
www. mirco. gov.na/documents/140810/509249/Media+Statement+on+the+situation+in+
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limited) reasoning on the use of chemical weapons. Prime Minister
Trudeau noted that "Canada condemns in the strongest possible terms
the use of chemical weapons in last week's attack .... Canada supports
the decision by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France to
take action to degrade the Assad regime's ability to launch chemical
weapons attacks against its own people."1 02 Similarly, Japan's Foreign
Minister stated,
Japan's position is that we will never accept the use of chemical weapons, we
believe that in the case that chemical weapons are used, the parties who used
them must be punished. ... In this context, Japan is able to support the present
determination of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France not to
accept the proliferation of the use of chemical weapons, and understands these
measures.1

03

04
Emblematic of the new
Similar responses were commonplace.1

expansionist approach's
justifications, proponents
endorsed CBW exception.
Minister of Foreign Affairs

prioritization of narrow or limited
emphasized the reduced scope of the
Perhaps most explicitly, the Bulgarian
announced,

We consider missile strikes in Syria as a one-time military operation and as an
opportunity to prevent new chemical attacks. We believe that this is a one-time
limited blow to bases for the production of chemical weapons. We believe that
this one-off action should prevent the use of chemical weapons against peaceful
05
citizens.1

The emergence of narrow or limited appeals exhibits an outward

perspective. This detracts from the expansionist camp's internal logic
and normative appeal. It cuts against the very basis and rationale that

has most persuasively justified deviations from a black-letter Charter
account. States that offer narrow or limited justifications may be less
concerned with the integrity of the ad bellum regime or the structure

Syria/a7688479-f282-4ac0-84ea-3b97d9b80d46 [https://perma.cc/7AWQ-JCZ4] (archived
Sept. 5, 2020).
102. Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, Statement by the Prime Minister
on Airstrikes in Syria (April 13, 2018), https://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2018/04/13/statementprime-minister-airstrikes-syria [https://perma.cc/GKB5-4CYB] (archived Sept. 19,
2020).
103. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Extraordinary Press Conference by
ForeignMinister Taro Kono, JUST SEC. (Apr. 14, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp[https://perma.cc/9UEE-EKKD]
content/uploads/2018/04/Japan-Syria-strikes-2018.pdf
(archived Sept. 6, 2020).
104. For an exhaustive account, see Dunkelberg et al., Mapping Reactions, supra
note 14.

105. Bulgaria Calls for De-Escalation of Tensions After US-led Airstrike on Syria,
SOFIA GLOBE (Apr. 14, 2018), https://sofiaglobe.com/2018/04/14fbulgaria-calls-for-de[https://perma.cc/WXK8-RES3]
escalation-of-tensions-after-us-led-air-strike-on-syria/
(archived Sept. 6, 2020).
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of the arguments offered in support of the use of force. State appeals
may constitute attempts to circumvent Charter prohibitions by
invoking familiar legal principles like the ban on the use of chemical
weapons.1 06 They may prioritize immediate need. Such motivations are
unlikely to provide a robust or introspective evaluation of how the
proposed action affects the viability of the ad bellum regime. While
there is a risk of oversubscribing intention to the positions assumed by
states, this same argumentative form is increasingly prevalent
amongst scholars that promote expansionist positions within

contemporary ad bellum debates.
Examples of this expansionist form divide between methodological
and normative claims. Several authors interpret state endorsements of
the airstrikes as evidencing a separate, specific right to intervention in
response to the use of CBWs.1 0 7 Following a similar series of strikes by

US forces in 2017, Michael Schmitt and Christopher Ford claimed that
state practice is contributing to the crystallization of a right to
intervention.1 08 The determinative factor, however, does not reflect the
scale of suffering, but rather "the attendant suffering [that] resulted
109
Schmitt and
from the use of a long-demonized unlawful weapon."
should be
nature
of
harm
Ford's conclusion suggests that "the
intervention
humanitarian
vis-a-vis
considered as a factor to consider
in addition to, or perhaps even in lieu of, the quantum of harm."1 10 This
recalls Harold Koh's fifth criterion, which offered the limited allowance
that an intervention's legality would be bolstered if undertaken to

prevent the use of a per se illegal means such as the use of a CBW."'
Interpreting state responses, Anders Henriksen identifies the
12
The airstrikes against
emergence of a limited form of intervention.

106. See generally Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for
signatureJan. 13, 1992, 1975 U.N.T.S. 45 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1997).
107. See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, Striking a Grotian Moment: How the Syrian
Airstrikes Changed InternationalLaw Relating to HumanitarianIntervention, 19 CHI.

J. INT'L L. 586, 591-92 (2019); see also Charlie Dunlap, Do the Syrian Strikes Herald a
New Norm of International Law?, LAWFIRE, (Apr. 14, 2018), https://sites.duke.edu/
[https
lawfire/2018/04/14/do-the-syria-strikes-herald-a-new-norm-of-international-law/
://perma.cc/YC8W-YAJK] (archived Sept. 6, 2020); Jen Lemnitzer, Syria Strikes Violated
International Law-Are the Rules of Foreign Intervention Changing?, CONVERsATION
(Apr. 18, 2018), https://theconversation.com/syria-strikes-violated-international-law[https://perma.cc/K9AX-XPL6]
are-the-rules-of-foreign-intervention-changing-95184
(archived Sept. 6, 2020).
108. See Michael N. Schmitt & Christopher M. Ford, Assessing U.S. Justifications
for Using Force in Response to Syria's Chemical Attacks: An International Law
Perspective, 9 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 283, 284 (2017).
109. Id. at 303.
110. Id.
111. Koh, supra note 88, at 1011.
112. Anders Henriksen, Trump's Missile Strike on Syria and the Legality of Using
Force to Deter Chemical Warfare, 23 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 33, 46 (2018).
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Syria are differentiated from traditional, broad understandings of
humanitarian intervention. Instead, Henriksen argues that they serve
the "more limited purpose of seeking to deter the Syrian regime from
continuing its use of chemical weapons against civilians in the civil
war." 1 1 Relying upon the absolute prohibition of the use of CBWs,

Henricksen suggests that a norm permitting the use of force to deter
chemical warfare may be in the initial stages of development.1 14
Henricksen explains that, as the resulting right to use force would
grant an exception to the Article 2(4) prohibition, "such an exception

should be construed as narrow as possible."' 1

5

Further normative content is provided by Andrew Bell who

proposes that force may be used in response to the deployment of
chemical

weapons.l"

Grounding the proposed

exception

in the

absolute ban on the use of such forms of warfare, Bell portends that
force, when exercised in response to a CBW attack, is justifiable.1"7
Support for this expansive ad bellum contention, Bell insists, is
bolstered as the limited use of force can be assessed on the basis of a
clear and determinate threshold.11 8 This is intended to alleviate the
minimalist concern that liberal interpretations of the Charter result in

the erosion of the use of force prohibition. Accordingly, Bell argues that
the inclusion of a CBW threshold provides a "clear, objective, brightline criterion."" 9 This, Bell claims, will "do much to alleviate the

concerns of R2P opponents who prioritize international stability, the
strength of the international legal regime, and the protection of human
rights." 2 0
Bell exhibits an increasingly familiar trend. To assuage
minimalist apprehensions regarding the open-ended, abuse-prone

nature of expansive use of force claims, Bell presses the limited and
determinate nature of a CBW exception.' 2 ' Again, this adheres to an
argumentative form that turns away from its normative allure to
emphasize an ability to respond to anticipated detractors.

Notwithstanding the necessity of safeguards, these narrow or limited
justifications fail to build upon the internal, normative coherence of the
expansionist camp. They neglect the prominent role that gravity

affords to the expansionist appeal. The use of chemical weapons is

113. Id. at 35.
114. Id. at 47.
115. Id.
116. Andrew M. Bell, Using Force Against the "Weapons of the Weak": Examining
a Chemical-Biological Weapons Usage Criterion for Unilateral Humanitarian
Intervention Under the Responsibility to Protect, 22 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 261,
319 (2014).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 267.
120. Id. at 268.
121. Id. at 267-68.
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clearly illegal and the cause of great suffering.1 22 It is, however,
difficult to articulate a coherent argument that draws upon a gravity
justification and allows intervention in response to the use of chemical
weapons, but not to instances of equal or greater suffering by other
means.

To reiterate, the allure of expansionist claims is derived from the
contention that a proposed use of force can prevent a humanitarian

catastrophe. This appeals to our collective memory, one that recalls
failure to prevent the Holocaust and reflects unwillingness to react to
the Rwandan genocide. Gravity anchors all such insistences. A limited
approach, reduced to instances when a particular form of weaponry is
employed, creates a scenario in which the deaths of hundreds of
civilians from the use of chemical weapons merit a different reaction,
and receive a distinct legal authorization, than do the far greater
amount that have been killed in Syria or elsewhere through

conventional forms of force. Moving from a gravity justification
towards a narrow or limited threshold will, as Marko Milanovic
observed, create a limited intervention that does little for the wider
humanitarian catastrophe. 123 It will introduce and facilitate the
strategic interests of states. The interests of powerful states are further
accentuated when attention is restricted to the limitation of a

particular form of weaponry that has repeatedly been described as the
"weapon of the weak" and has, within several international contexts,

been the subject of North-South debates.1 24 Ultimately, this dynamic
threatens to empower those that proponents of a limited approach
endeavor to restrain.

C. ProceduralJustifications:The Case of Collective Security
Issues concerning collective security do not feature prominently
within contemporary ad bellum debates. This deemphasis likely
reflects the relatively low number of instances in which force is used
Minimalist
mechanism. 12 5
security
collective
the
through
contributions to those debates that do engage with collective security
commonly adhere to the now well-trodden perspective that structures

122. Michael P. Scharf, Clear and Present Danger: Enforcing the International Ban
on Biological and Chemical Weapons Through Sanctions, Use of Force, and
Criminalization,20 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 477, 480 (1999).
123. Milanovic, supra note 13.
124. See Richard Price, A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo, 49 INT'L.
ORG. 73, 98, 103 (1995); Kevin Jon Heller, The Rome Statute Does Not Criminalise
Chemical
and
Biological
Weapons,
OPINIO
JURIS
(Nov.
5,
2015),
http://opiniojuris.org/2015/ 11/05/why-the-rome-statute-does-not-criminalise-chemicaland-biological-weapons/ [https://perma.cc/EN6G-V6LC] (archived August 31, 2020).
125. See Christine Gray, A Crisis of Legitimacy for the UN Collective Security
System, 56 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 157, 157 (2007).
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their approach to various other ad bellum issues. Adherents emphasize

the four corners of the Charter. They press the need to maintain a strict
reading of the articles contained within Chapter VII. They insist upon

the need to ensure a strict textual reading of Security Council
resolutions.' 2 6 Accordingly, minimalists hold that the use of force is
most legitimate when it observes entrenched procedural processes.1 27
Expansionists present a more complicated narrative. Rather than
drawing upon substantive normative factors, the appeal of collective
security stems from its unambiguous legal status and limited
application. This naturally aligns with minimalist predispositions. But

expansionists make limited reference to collective security. When such
references are forwarded, these limited mentions commonly cite the
Security Council's systemic paralysis to evidence the need to broaden
the ability of actors to use force in either self-defense or the defense of
others.12 8 These traditional references do not address the collective
mechanism itself or propose enhancing the scope or authority of
Chapter VII resolutions. However, expansionist arguments are not
completely unaffected by the persuasiveness that accompanies the
legitimizing pull of collective security.
The final shift in expansionist argumentation concerns the use of
procedural justifications to address the collective security process
itself. This form of legal appeal is expansionist-it suggests that a
particular use of force is permissible when a black-letter reading of the
Charter or a plain text reading of a Security Council resolution asserts
otherwise. As with previous expansionist accounts, these justifications
maintain that the Charter's limits are broader than many minimalists

assume. And it is procedural-it presents a justification for a
particular use of force by emphasizing a permissive interpretation of

the collective security system's authorization process. Accordingly,
claims of legality are grounded in the mere fact that the decision to use
force was taken in accordance with the procedural requirements
prescribed through the collective security system. By elevating the
legitimizing force of the authorization process, proponents minimize

substantive considerations concerning the validity of the threat to
peace and security.1 2 9 As with expansionist articulations of rules-based

&

126. See, e.g., Geir Ulfstein & Hege Fosund Christiansen, The Legality of the
NATO Bombing in Libya, 62 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 159, 171 (2013); see also Jules Lobel
Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council:Ambiguous Authorizationsto Use Force,
Cease-Firesand the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 124, 125 (1999).
127.

See Corten, Controversies over the Customary Prohibition,supra note 40, at

815-16.
128. See, e.g., David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Casey & Mark Wendell DeLaquil,
Preemptionand Law in the Twenty-First Century, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 467, 477 (2005).
129. See generallyIan Johnstone, Security Council Deliberations:The Power of the
Better Argument, 14 EuR. J. INT'L. L. 437 (2003).
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and narrow or limited justifications, such procedural emphasis
misaligns with the traditional expansionist form.
A prominent form of these procedural justifications draws upon

imprecise Security Council resolutions to provide either ex post or
implied authorization of a specific use of force. 13 0 Ex post or retroactive
authorization occurs when a Security Council resolution is presented
to retroactively justify an armed intervention. Proponents suggest that

NATO's decision to use force in Kosovo was subsequently justified
through Security Council Resolution 1244 which, following the
unauthorized aerial campaign, established a civilian and military

presence in the former Yugoslavia and created the UN's Interim
Administration Mission.1 31 Similarly, Security Council Resolution
788-in which the Security Council commended the Economic

Community of West African States (ECOWAS) "for its efforts to restore
peace, security and stability in Liberia"-was presented to provide ex
post legal authorization following the organization's incursion into the

West African nation.132
Implied (or revived) authorizations cite a past Security Council
resolution to justify an undertaken or proposed use of force that lacks

direct, contemporaneous

approval.

States read an analogous or

adjacent resolution and, through permissive interpretation, assert that
the past proclamation authorizes the current use of force.133 Following
NATO's military campaign in Kosovo, several states cited Security
34
Council Resolutions 1160, 1199, and 1203 to infer legitimacy.1

However, while these resolutions condemned the excessive use of force
by Serbia, they did not authorize a military response.1 35 Implying
present authorization from a past permission requires the user to

transpose, and often strain, both the context and language of the cited
resolution. This attracts controversy. When the US-led coalition began

130. For a general discussion of implied authorization, see CHRISTINE GRAY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 361-81 (4th ed. 2018) [hereinafter GRAY,

4th ed.]. See also Ian Johnstone, When the Security Council is Divided: Imprecise
Authorizations, Implied Mandates, and the 'Unreasonable Veto', in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 227, 238-43 (Mark Weller ed.,
2015).

131. See Henkin, Kosovo, supra note 75, at 827.
132. See S.C. Res. 788, ¶ 1 (Nov. 19, 1992); see also Erika De Wet, The Evolving
Role of ECOWAS and the SADC in Peace-Operations:A Challenge to the Primacy of the
United Nations Security Council in Matters of Peace and Security?, 27 LEIDEN J. INT'L L.
353, 358 (2016).

133. This form of argumentation resembles domestic efforts that insist the 2002
Authorization for the Use of Military Force provided authorization for U.S. officials to
target the Islamic State. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Obama's AUMF
Legacy, 110 AM. J. INT'L L. 628, 637 (2016).
134. See GRAY, 4th ed., supra note 130, at 366 (explaining expansion of "implied
authorization" by member states); see also Johnstone, supra note 130, at 239.
135. See GRAY, 4th ed., supra note 130, at 366; see also Johnstone, supra note 130,
at 239.
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its military campaign against Iraq in 2003, US, British, and Australian

officials insisted that the resulting use of force received implicit
authorization through Security Council Resolutions 678, 687, and

1441.136 But again, these resolutions did not contemplate the
concurrent use of force. Resolutions 678 and 687 were passed at the
commencement of the first Gulf War in 1991.137 Whereas Resolution

1441 recalled these earlier measures, it found that Iraq was in material
breach of the imposed disarmament obligations and established a new
inspections regime. 13 8
These past instances of expost and implied justification are devoid
of direct Security Council authorization. Yet, these moments also tell

of how procedural processes are employed by advocates of particular
military

initiatives to permissively suggest when

and how the

collective security system may authorize the use of force. They may
also provide a means of assuring the validity of the ad bellum regime.
Ian Johnstone suggests that these forms of argument do, at a
minimum, bolster the relevancy of an otherwise inactive Security

Council. 139 Johnstone and Michael Byers separately contend that
ambiguity, resulting from variants of these forms of justification, can
benefit international law (and, perhaps, the ad bellum regime less
directly)

by

"cushioning it

from

the

effects

of deep

political

140

While such claims reflect traditional expansionist
differences."
motivations, forwarding procedural justifications to facilitate features
of the collective security system risks privileging process-based
considerations to the exclusion of the proposed course of action's
normative desirability.

Monica Hakimi offers a compelling vision of the jus ad bellum that
141
In so
shares similarities with this emergent expansionist form.
doing, Hakimi advances a further procedural claim, suggesting that

processes occurring within the Security Council that fail to produce a
formal resolution should nevertheless receive due consideration within
resulting ad bellum analyses. 142 Hakimi presents a descriptive claim
that convincingly demonstrates the significance of the identified
informal processes. 143 Within this account, discussions amongst

Council members and resolutions that do not explicitly authorize the
use of force become part of the jus ad bellum. Often neglected by

136. See GRAY, 4th ed., supra note 130, at 361-66.
137. See S.C. Res. 678 (Nov. 29, 1990); see also S.C. Res. 687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
138. See S.C. Res. 1441 (Nov. 8, 2002).
139. See Johnstone, supra note 130, at 243.
140. Id. See also Michael Byers, Agreeing to Disagree:Security Council Resolution
1441 and IntentionalAmbiguity, 10 GLOB. GOVERNANCE 165, 167 (2004).
141. See generally Monica Hakimi, The Jus Ad Bellum's RegulatoryForm, 112 AM.
J. INT'L. L. 151 (2018) [hereinafter Hakimi, Regulatory Form].
142. See generally id.
143. See generally id.
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accounts,

Hakimi demonstrates

how these

161 7
informal

exchanges shape and define how the use of force is understood and then
implemented. Informal lawmaking that draws upon "particularistic

processes" are differentiated from those parts of the jus ad bellum that
appeal to general standards of law. 144 The informal processes at the
center of Hakimi's claim occur when a specific action exceeds accepted
ad bellum standards. They occur when the informal processes confer
legal legitimacy on the resulting uses of force. 145 Such instances are
evidenced by the processes surrounding the 2017 US airstrikes in Syria
and in response to military interventions in Mali and Yemen.14
Reactions to Hakimi's informal process largely focus on the way
that the ad bellum regime is conceptualized. 147 Here, however, the
focus is on Hakimi's normative contribution. In response to what are
framed as the limitations of the strict adherence approach, Hakimi

asserts that reliance on informal processes strengthen the ad bellum
regime. 148 The resulting account is intended to address the
presumptive concern that reliance on informal processes risks
weakening restrictions on the unilateral use of force and may become

susceptible to the attempts of states to broaden the boundaries of
permissibility.
Hakimi compares informal regulation to an alternative universe
that relies upon general principles. 149 The informal approach is
deemed preferable. First, Hakimi suggests that the alternative to
informal regulation is not strict adherence, but will instead amount to
circumstances in which states act without Security Council
approval. 150 This, Hakimi claims, will weaken the ad bellum regime in
more significant and lasting ways. 1 51 Second, the informal approach is
15 2
And
presented as limiting the precedential value of specific conduct.
the
by
increasing
benefits
process
the
informal
tells
that
third, Hakimi

power of collective process. 153 This curbs the impulses of militarilyengaged states that otherwise promote expansive interpretations of
the ad bellum regime. 154 Collectively, Hakimi's account offers a
compelling means to protect the collective security system that is

144. See id. at 163.
145. See id. at 167.
146. See Christian J. Tams, Three QuestionsAbout "InformalRegulation", 112 AM.
J. INT'L L. UNBOUND 108, 111-12 (2018).
147. See Ashley S. Deeks, Introductionto the Symposium on Monica Hakimi, 'The
Jus Ad Bellum's Regulatory Form', 112 AM. J. INT'L L. UNBOUND 94, 95-96 (2018).
148. See Hakimi, Regulatory Form, supra note 141, at 185-86.
149. See id. at 186-90.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 184.
153. See id. at 185.
154. See id. at 189-90.
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premised on the belief that informal regulation can be more effective
than consistent appeals to general standards.
In endorsing positions that stretch and, in select instances, exceed
the boundaries of the UN Charter, Hakimi's informal approach
situates alongside emergent expansionist appeals. By prioritizing a
normative response to anticipated minimalist objectives, Hakimi
exhibits a principle feature of the new expansionist approach. This is
consistent with the argumentative form that proponents of an
expansionist ad bellum claim increasingly employ to justify their legal
assertions. The implications of this position merit consideration.
Relevant expansionist contentions are moved to supplement the

deficiencies of collective mechanisms or the consequences of Security
Council politicization. In response they present appeals that purport to

facilitate just outcomes. The procedural accounts that inform Hakimi's
preferred process do not, however, provide this requisite normative
guidance. The content of the identified informal processes, intended to
confer legitimacy on a particular use of force, is underarticulated. This
can create scenarios in which deviations from the Charter may proceed
in the absence of those strong normative justifications that
traditionally position expansionist claims between what is and what
ought. It is unclear how such a result, devoid of normative fodder, will
tilt the persuasive balance between circumstances that require an

expansive reading of the jus ad bellum and the duty to assure better
substantive outcomes.
Procedures assume a highly significant role in promoting justice.
However, in nearly all such instances, the identified procedure is

established to provide more than pure procedural justice. It is, in
nearly every instance, established to ensure due regard for substantive
considerations. A pure procedural approach, employed to assess the
appropriateness of a decision to use force, bears enormous
consequence. The Security Council's authorization of the use of force
constitutes a near unique example of an almost absolute procedural

process. Although this is a deficiency of the current ad bellum regime
that requires redress, current criticism of the Security Council is

motivated by the Council's reluctance to intervene rather than the
prospect

of over-intervention. 15 5

Despite

Security Council provides an identifiable

many

deficiencies,

the

procedure that, when

uninterrupted, will produce a decision that reflects undisputed
authority. Informal processes do not. Without an external, normative

framework to legitimize
abuse by states that seek
Informal regulation,
occurrences of unilateral

155.

such processes, a clear potential exists for
to legitimize a particular use of force.
Hakimi suggests, is preferable to unfettered
state action that discount Security Council

See GRAY, 4th ed., supra note 130, at 326, 366.
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156
primacy and deviate from general principles of international law.
Nonetheless, when states act unilaterally, they lack the procedural
legitimacy that accompanies Security Council authorization. There is

therefore a greater prospect for reliance on traditional expansionist
arguments that are based (and assessed) on the substantive moral
justifications that hold that the use of force is required in response to

a specific case. The promotion of an argumentative form that elevates
such informal processes nullifies the core expansionist appeal. The
provision of a procedural approach, to legitimize uses of force, relieves
states (to a significant though not absolute extent) of a duty to provide
substantive, moral, and normative justifications. It risks facilitating
the pursuit of self-serving state interests.

Hakimi counters that informal regulation could be employed to

5 7 Citing the
blunt permissive lawmaking initiatives by states. 1
elevation of the unwilling or unable test, Hakimi claims that
accompanying informal approaches may draw upon Security Council
Resolution 2249 to resist expansive articulations. 158 This Resolution
acknowledged the threat posed by the Islamic State and called upon
member states to take all measures compliant with international law
and the UN Charter to prevent or suppress acts of terror.1 5 9 However,
it is unclear whether Resolution 2249 has had any effect on the

acceptance or development of the unwilling or unable test. More
significantly, if one recognizes the potential of informal processes to
mitigate the undesirable or unduly expansionist conduct of specific
states, one must also accept that the opposite outcome is possible. In
such a scenario, the majority of states at the Security Council may
promote undesirable ad bellum positions in a manner similar to the
General Assembly which has, in certain moments, promoted
controversial resolutions. If instances in which an expansive use of
force is proposed or undertaken are only governed by an informal
approach to the collective process, they remain susceptible to shifting
political tendencies.
Each of the identified expansionist justifications-rules-based,
narrow or limited, and procedural appeals-shifts the argumentative
emphasis that traditionally structures and strengthens expansionist
ad bellum claims. Though this emergent argumentative form has been
documented through its manifestation in various use of force debates,
this Article does not move to endorse either the legality or desirability
of the resulting interpretations or the posited doctrines. Many of the

concurrent debates exhibit an inescapable assumption. Recalling the
familiar duality of apology and utopia, there is a prevalent view that

156.
157.
158.
159.

Hakimi, Regulatory Form, supra note 141, at 183.
Id. at 187-88.
Id. at 188; see also S.C. Res. 2249 (Nov. 20, 2015).
S.C. Res. 2249, supra note 158, ¶ 1.
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expansionist ad bellum appeals are offered in the service of state
interests. Commenting on the transatlantic divide, Tom Ruys and Luca

Ferro observe (while acknowledging the need for a nuanced view) that
while there may be a more critical attitude on the part of European legal doctrine
to expansionist claims concerning the permissible recourse to force, and a greater
awareness for the possibility of abuse, a number of U.S. scholars seems focused
primarily on justifying US actions to the broader international community and
160
to provide the theoretical arguments to legally underpin these actions.

There is an abundance of fact patterns that lend themselves to
such unfavorable analysis and evidence instances of state misuse. It is,
however, the purpose of this Article to move beyond this apologist

paradigm by reorientating emphasis on the compelling case and not
the cynical application. Throughout, this Part has emphasized
expansionist claims that, like their minimalist analogues, wish to
ensure international law's legitimacy and function. Though this Article

suggests that the structure of the emergent and aforementioned
expansionist form does not serve this end effectively, this Article does
not intend to reinvent the wheel. Instead it proposes a reversion.

IV. A REVERSION TO FORM: THE BETTER EXPANSIONIST ARGUMENT

When Hersch Lauterpacht wrote his foretelling 1933 essay, The
Persecution of the Jews in Germany, his call for a truly international
response to the unfolding events appealed to "broad principles of
international peace, political progress and social ethics commanding
universal recognition.1"161 Continuing, Lauterpacht grounded his call
in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Articles 4 and 11 conferred,

respectively, that the League may consider instances affecting or
disturbing international peace or the good understanding between
nations upon which peace depends. 16 2 Lauterpacht told his audience

that the wrongs visited upon Germany's Jewish minority were of such
magnitude that inaction compromised the international community's
moral authority.16 3 The existing legal architecture would not be

160. Tom Ruys & Luca Ferro, Divergent Views on the Content and Relevance of the
Jus ad Bellum in Europe and the United States? The Case for the U.S.-Led Military
Coalition Against 'Islamic State', in CONCEPTS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE AND
THE UNITED STATES 3 (Chiara Giorgetti & Guglielmo Verdirame eds., forthcoming 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2731597
(last visited Sept. 20,
2020) [https://perma.cc/Z2JF-KMVH] (archived Sept. 20, 2020).
161. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Persecution of Jews in Germany, in 5
INTERNATIONAL LAw: BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPAcHT 728, 729

(Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 2004).
162. See League of Nations Covenant arts. 4, 11.
163. Lauterpacht, supra note 161, at 733.
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interpreted to preclude an imperative demand. Inaction was
indefensible so Lauterpacht derived a solution through a reading of
international law that melded moral necessity with legal
permissibility.16 4

The most compelling expansionist appeals exhibit a moral urgency
that is based upon notions of self-defense or the defense of others. The
structure of an expansionist claim, whether proposing an action that is
beyond the limits of the Charter or forwarding a permissive conception

of the Charter's boundaries, demonstrates that legal assessments
reflect moral requirement. Such reasoning is neither straightforward
nor will it appeal to many that are invested in ad bellum debates.
States may be more responsive to fact-specific arguments grounded in
considerations of effectiveness. A preponderance of minimalists hold
that limiting permissible uses of force best maintains the moral
purpose of the international order.1 65 The nature of a particular moral
appeal will compel some and fail to move others. The differing moral
intuitions that inform the relevant ad bellum debates are reflected in
the range of considerations that dictate how competing Charter
interests are appropriately balanced. However, linking the moral

necessity of an ad bellum appeal to an assessment of the appeal's legal
soundness emphasizes the expansionist claim's distinctive character.

It proceeds on the grounds that the expansionist camp itself has
established. And, it provides an argumentative structure that couples

moral and legal considerations and that reflects the principle strength
of expansionist appeals-their ability to provide a permissive legal
response to an urgent moral need through a normative reading that
bridges the lex lata and the lex ferenda.
While the content of a particular moral appeal is context specific,
a structured expansionist argument can persuasively link moral
considerations with legal prescriptions by grounding a Charter
interpretation in (i) a standard of global justice and (ii) a standard of
legal soundness. Both elements of this argumentative form are
mutually dependent. Contentions, structured accordingly, do more
than address the exigencies of a particular threat or offer redress to a
vulnerable population. They tell of why the expansionist action serves
the purposes of international law. A particular fact pattern may well
compel attention. It is, however, necessary for the expansionist
argument to consider the institutional ramifications of the proposed

action and ground the favored response in a desirable and feasible

6 6 This
conception designed to advance international law's purposes.'

164. Id.
165. See generally D'Aspremont, supra note 16.
166. This reflects Buchanan's claim that to justify an assertion that a group
satisfying particular conditions has a right to statehood, one must consider the effects
on the system-in particular the effects on human rights and peace-of allowing alike
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approach aligns with Richard Falk's appeal that international lawyers
contribute to the creation of a systematic framework that reflects broad
norms and international consensus and that can be applied to assess
proposed uses of force that strain Charter allowances. 16 7
By structuring moral before legal considerations, adherents to the
expansionist camp emphasize their most appealing deliberative
feature. An account that speaks to both the requirements of justice and
the necessity of legal soundness maintains the internal logic of the

expansionist camp. In accordance with this logic, proponents are better
positioned to delineate an interdependence between moral ends and
legal means that reflect and respond to the Charter's normative
prescriptions. By conferring lexical priority upon justice or morality-

based considerations-when a strict reading of the Charter delimits
responses to the compelling need to ensure the defense of self or the
defense of others-expansionists may offer solutions to complex
problems that reflect general legal principles.
The prescribed standard of justice constitutes the normative core
of the expansionist claim. It is a continuation of a long tradition whose
adherents-Pufendorf, Vattel, Locke, Kant, Mill and so many others-

reject realist predispositions. Instead, they insist that state relations
are structured by a series of moral rules. 168 Grounded in a conception
of global justice, the efficacious expansionist argument articulates, and
thus reinforces, international law's moral basis as conveyed by the UN
Charter's preamble.1 69 It provides an account of why the expansionist
ad bellum claim is in furtherance of, not a departure from, the norms
enshrined through international law.

The legal soundness standard takes seriously international law's
regulatory and prescriptive functions. It recognizes the need to convey
a

set

of

discernable

rules

that

distinguish

law

from

purely

philosophical or policy-based pursuits. Insulation against the abuse or
bad faith application of expansionist arguments, so often the source of
the

minimalist

camp's

apprehension,

further

motivates

this

constitutive standard. Considerations of legal soundness that draw
upon the international rule of law-understood here as an ability to
link a specific legal argument with a general principle or norm
prescribed within the relevant legal frameworks-offer a standard that

can merge the normative and prescriptive features of an expansionist

groups that satisfy similar conditions to attempt to create a state of their own. See
BUCHANAN, supra note 19, at 27.
167. See Richard A. Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of
Retaliation, 63 AM. J. INTL. L. 415, 443 (1969).
168. Charles R. Beitz, Bounded Morality:Justice and the State in World Politics,
33 INT'L ORG. 405, 408 (1979).
169.

See STEVEN R. RATNER, THE THIN JUSTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A MORAL

RECKONING OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 1 (2015).
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appeal.1 70 The proffered interpretation of these rules and principles
must be plausibly conceived and exhibit coherence.
Expansionists cannot expect the benefit of the doubt. Our warweary society possesses a healthy dose of uncertainty about the
appropriateness of military intervention. It exhibits a more corrosive,
but nevertheless growing, hint of isolationism. Both factors conspire to
resist the moral pull of humanitarianism. The invisible college of

international lawyers-conditioned by instances of abusive uses of
force and quick to cite disastrous, misleading, or incomplete
interventions-will continue to divide over how international law's

legitimacy is best maintained. Where a particular context-one in
which a state faces a direct and violent threat to its population-may
provide a primafacie justification for the use of force, the expansionist

cannot assume that a compelling fact pattern alone will favor action
that pushes the Charter's limits.

Any use of force must be explained. States commonly resort to a
mix of moral and legal language to articulate the reasoning that
accompanies military action. 171 The resulting use of force will, by its
nature, strain an ad bellum regime that is ostensibly intended to
minimize the reasons for which force is permissible. 172 A particular use
of force that pushes beyond a plain text, uncontroversial reading of the
UN Charter further strains the purpose of the ad bellum regime and,
if persuasive, provides an additional account of when a state may use
force. It is thus contingent on the proponent of this particular use of

force to demonstrate that their reading of the Charter, that their
advocacy of military action, does not frustrate but instead reassures
the ad bellum regime.1 73

When Thomas Franck referenced the paradox of good law
producing bad results, he envisioned instances in which adherence to
a sound legal requirement, like Article 2(4), caused 'or allowed a

morally indefensible outcome. 174 There would be no simple solutions.
Franck noted that exceptions to otherwise desirable legal rules risk
undermining law's claim to legitimacy which is, in part, contingent on
consistent application. 175 Equally, however, law's legitimacy erodes if

legal adherence produces indefensible consequences.1 76 The worst

170. See infra Part IW.C.
171. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1620, 1621 (1984).
172.

See BRIAN OREND, THE MORALITY OF WAR 31-32 (2006).

173. This can be understood as a continuation of Michael Reisman's
acknowledgement that traditional conceptions of sovereignty have been replaced by a
"new constitutive, human rights-based conception of popular sovereignty." See W.
Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary InternationalLaw,
84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 870 (1990).
174.

FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 43, at 175.

175.
176.

See id.
See id.
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impulses of international society frequently mount frontal challenges
that push society to question law's function. Yet the killing fields and

the mass graves that document the twentieth century's most egregious
atrocities have been credibly cited both in support of and in opposition
to expansionist interpretations of the ad bellum regime.1 77
The tension between strict adherence to the wording of the ad
bellum regime and interpretative approaches that respond to
conditions on the ground are inescapable. Disassociating legal and
moral considerations may allow (many) international lawyers to avoid

engaging with the corollary between adherence and outcomes, but it
does little to shield international law from the consequences of
Franck's paradox. Both minimalists and expansionists make a choice.
When proponents of an expansionist approach seek to preserve the
legitimacy of international law by reconciling legal prescriptions with
the demands of a nonideal world, their contentions maintain

consistency and coherence with their professed objective if they take
seriously and look to meld moral and legal considerations. Such dual
reasoning is, however, avoided by both minimalists who favor a strict
reading of the ad bellum regime and by expansionists who promote

rules-based, limited or incident-specific, and procedural justifications.
The moral and the legal need not be so purposefully uncoupled.
A. The Intermittent Relationship between InternationalLaw and
Morality
International law's relationship with morality has been both
constitutive and absent. The modern international lawyer remains

largely,

though

not exclusively,

indebted

tradition.1 78 Bound by treaty and custom,

to a positivist

legal

international law is

understood as a social fact that is formed through a process of state
consent.1 79 As Steven Ratner explains, while international lawyers
hold strong moral convictions, these are often separated from scholarly
endeavors and deemed ultra vires to legal pursuits. 80
The contemporary division between law and morality is, however,

a modern advent. 181 In ancient Rome, the jus civile and the jus gentium

177. See generally JOSHUA JAMES KASSNER, RWANDA AND THE MORAL OBLIGATION
OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (2013); DAVID N. GIBBS, FIRST Do No HARM:
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAvIA (2009).

178. Benedict Kingsbury, Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: International
Society, Balance of Power and Lassa Oppenheim's Positive InternationalLaw, 13 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 401, 428 (2002).
179. Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters-Non-State Actors,
Treaties, and the Changing Sources of InternationalLaw, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 137,
140 (2005).
180. Id. at 20.
181. See FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE, supranote 43, at 175.
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were conceived symbiotically. 182 From Aquinas to Blackstone, law and

morality were understood as interdependent aspects of a cohesive legal
system.1 83 It was not until the Reformation cast aspersions on divine
interpretation and an era of European secularism heralded
positivism's dominance that morality and law were perceived as

separate pursuits.1 84 Though removed from much of the contemporary
international legal discourse, questions of law's relationship with

morality would again come to structure many of the great post-war
jurisprudential debates.1 85

Attempts to regulate the use of force reflect this trajectory. Nearly
all efforts to regulate recourse to war accept that, in certain
circumstances, when particular conditions are satisfied, the use of
force may be justifiable.186 These considerations-determinations of
what the circumstances are and how the conditions are met-

historically present as moral deliberations. Michael Walzer begins Just
and Unjust Wars by explaining that "for as long as men and women
have talked about war, they have talked about it in terms of right and
wrong." 187 Since antiquity, these deliberations contemplate the

appropriateness

of violence, the means by which force may be

employed, and the instances in which war should be limited or
permitted.1 88
In De Civitate Dei, St. Augustine proffered that while war was

lamentable, a "wrong suffered at the hands of an adversary imposed
the necessity of waging just wars."1 89 This prescription was both
grounded in a conception of morality-Augustine contended that the
only valid reason to engage in war was to preserve peace-and initiated
a tradition of regulating the use of force that would develop within just
war doctrine and formalize through international legal regulation from
the nineteenth century onwards.1 90
Whether forged in theology, the subject of secularization, or
through formalist prescription, legal and moral considerations have
long structured how we justify, condemn, and debate war. Though

positivism, from the time of Hobbes and the Peace of Westphalia,

182. See id.
183. Id. at 175-76.
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separationof Law and Morals, 71
HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958); see also Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law -A Reply
to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958).
186. See HIGGINS, supranote 28, at 7-8.
187.

WALZER, supra note 30, at 3.

188. See MARCO SASSOLI & ANTOINE M. BOUVIER, How DOES LAw PROTECT IN
WAR? 121 (2d ed., vol.1 2006); see also HIGGINS, supra note 28, at 9.
189.

ST. AUGUSTINE, DE CIVITATE DEI CONTRA PAGANOS 150-51 (Book XIX Sec.

VII 1960).
190. See DINSTEIN, supranote 22, at 64. See generally John Langan, The Elements
of St. Augustine's Just War Theory, 53 J. REL. ETHICS 19 (1984).
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muted the formal influence of moral deliberation, this too would ebb.
Moral considerations again became instructive.191 Following the
Second World War, the establishment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and
a jurisprudential shift, a moral account of international justice
informed and grounded the legal prescriptions enumerated throughout
the UN Charter.1 92
The contemporary ad bellum regime repudiated an era when
"notions of sovereignty and positivism meant that every state had a
sovereign right, and indeed the 'proper authority' to initiate warfare,

regardless of its cause."1 93 Post-war efforts to reform the ad bellum
regime and redress the shortcomings of previous initiatives like the
94
Kellogg-Briand Pact were firmly grounded in moral propositions.1

Article 1(1) of the UN Charter declared that the Organization's basic
purpose was to "maintain international peace and security, and to that
end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to peace."196 While Article 2(4), the cornerstone of
the ad bellum regime, codified the norm prohibiting the use of force in
all but limited circumstances, this construction is fully understood as

providing formal legal articulation to the Charter's moral purpose.
The ad bellum regime's moral foundation vests in the Charter's
Preamble. The preparatory section declares the determination of
member states to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, to ensure respect for
international law, and to promote social progress.1 96 Collectively, these
purposes offer a vision of global justice that Dag Hammarskjold
believed to be "greater than the Organization in which they are
embodied, and [that] the aims which they are to safeguard are holier
than the policies of any single nation or people."1 97
From inception, the Charter's efforts to regulate the use of force

were conceived as a set of broad norms that would guide state behavior.
Lord Halifax, the British diplomat who led the United Kingdom's
delegation at the San Francisco Conference, explained that "instead of
trying to govern the actions of the members and the organs of the
United Nations by precise and intricate codes of procedure, we have
preferred to lay down purposes and principles under which they are to

191.

FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 43, at 176.

192. Id. at 177.
193. See HIGGINS, supra note 28, at 18.
194. General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy,
Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57, 732 (entered into force July 24, 1929).
195. U.N. Charter art. 1(1).
196. Id. art. 2.
197. U.N. SCOR, 11th Sess., 751st mtg. 1 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.751 (Oct. 31, 1959).
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act." 198 Though Lord Halifax believed that the Charter functioned as a
"living instrument" that would prescribe moral standards of behavior
while providing states "freedom to accommodate their actions to
circumstances which today no man can foresee," the core of the debate
between minimalists and expansionists reflects competing visions of

the Charter. 19 9
Expansionists, as has been noted, embrace some iteration of the
view that law is not merely a set of rigid rules. Instead, law is viewed
as existing for certain ends. This is necessary, says J.L. Brierly,

because "the life with which any system of law has to deal is too
complicated, and human foresight too limited, for law to be completely
formulated in a set of rules, so that sit'uations perpetually arise which
fall outside all rules already formulated." 2 00 When facing
uncontemplated scenarios, when functioning within a nonideal world
where prescribed systems of redress and protection have proven
ineffectual or insufficient, expansionists identify relevant principles.
These principles determine and guide appropriate actions. Brierly

continues, "[l]aw cannot and does not refuse to solve a problem because
it is new and unprovided for; it meets such situations by resorting to a
principle, outside formulated law ... appealing to reason as the
justification for its decisions."2 0 1
Expansionist appeals are either normative or methodological.
Normative contentions propose legal revision. These claims identify
law's insufficiencies, its blind spots, and its failures. In response, they
argue what the law ought to be. 202 Methodological contentions insist
that the law is correctly interpreted in a way, and in accordance with
a means, that produces a different, purportedly more efficacious, result
than that which occurs through a black-letter reading of the relevant
legal provision. 20 3 This, as with the broader distinction between
minimalists and expansionists, reflects what Frederick Schauer

identifies as at the core of all jurisprudential debates-opposing

198.

Lord Halifax, Verbatim Minutes of First Meeting of Commission 1, June 14,

1945, U.N. Doc. 1006 (June 15, 1945), in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: SELECTED DOCUMENTs 529, 537 (1946).
199. Id.

200.

J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 23 (5th ed. 1955); see also FRANCK,

RECOURSE TO FORCE, supra note 43, at 177.

201. BRIERLY, supra note 200, at 23-24.
202. See, e.g., Eliav Lieblich, InternalJus ad Bellum, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 687 (2016);
see also Henkin, Kosovo, supra note 75, at 826-28; Robert Howse & Ruti Teitel, Why
https://www.project(Sept. 4, 2013),
Syria?, PROJECT SYNDICATE
Attack
syndicate.org/commentary/humanitarian-versus-punitive-purposes-in-military-interve

ntions-by-robert-howse-and-ruti-teitel?barrier=accesspaylog
[https://perma.cc/63FG-YJMZ] (archived Aug. 30, 2020).
203. See, e.g., Scharf, supranote 122, at 508-10.
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contentions "about which sources of decisional guidance are to be
treated as law." 204
Expansionist claims that endeavor to ensure the ad bellum
regime's legitimacy are motivated by a normative undercurrent and

the belief that a reading of the law that produces an unacceptable
outcome, a reductio ad absurdum, is an incomplete reading of the law.
The subsequent debates regarding the reasons and principles that
justify both forms of expansionist arguments are furthered when

grounded in this inherent purpose. They most consistently reflect
expansionist objectives when they embrace their claim to international
law's moral purpose. The moral grounding that distinguishes

expansionist arguments from minimalist claims may be articulated in
various ways. The principle of global justice, however, provides a
compelling standard to forward a legal argument that draws upon
morality. Upon this basis, ad bellum arguments that purport to be

more responsive to modern threats and better ensure the defense of
self or the defense of others may be advanced and, ultimately,
adjudged.
B. The Standardof Justice
Considerations of justice have moved from the domestic to the
international sphere. Contemporary events-genocide and mass
atrocities, the rise of and response to transnational terrorism, and the
proliferation of human rights-now augment the lineage of debates
that offer justice-based theories to determine when and how force may
be used. Where traditional accounts present notions of international
justice that afford centrality to the state, more recent contestations of
2 05
global justice position the individual as the primary unit of concern.

The resulting accounts of global justice provide an effective frame to
advance first order moral considerations that place notions of gravity
and necessity at the forefront of an expansionist ad bellum argument.

Instances of war and persecution, those moments when the use of
force is applied in response to or in furtherance of a wrong, inform

foundational articulations of global justice. 206 The scope of global
justice, however, exceeds assessments of the use of force. Myriad issues
including poverty and inequality, wealth distribution, environmental
derogation, trade regimes, and public health considerations illuminate

global justice discourses. 207 Collectively, the philosophical, legal, and

204. Frederick Schauer, Law's Boundaries, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2436 (2017).
205. See Gillian Brock, Global Justice, STAN. ENcYcLOPEDIA OF PHIL. ¶ 1.1 (Mar.
[https://
6, 2015), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/justice-globall
perma.cc/QM8C-QTG5] (archived Sept. 1, 2020).
206. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 6-7 (1999).
207. See, e.g., RATNER, supra note 169, at 11.
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political manifestations of these inquiries ask some iteration of the
question: Can an identifiable set of norms provide a basis to measure,
and ultimately advance, the structures and institutions, as well as the
rights and obligations of actors, operating within the international

community?20 8
Global justice offers a prosaic standard that places the protection
of individuals at the center of ad bellum claims. 209 Conceptions of
global justice differ. 210 However, articulations of justice concur that a
just international society is one in which the preservation of peace and

the protection of human rights are afforded primacy. 21 1 As Steven
Ratner explains, "these are the first two principles mentioned in the
UN Charter, the most important document of contemporary
international law. They are the subject, explicit and implicit, of
numerous treaties and areas of customary international law; and they
guide decisionmakers in most of the great questions facing global
governance today. 212
The most telling objection to expansionist ad bellum arguments is
consequentialist. Beyond the substantive merits of any particular
contention, critics hold that expansionist justifications leave an
indelible mark on the ad bellum regime. The compounding
implications of claims that seek to broaden exceptions to the use of
force prohibition spurred Jean d'Aspremont's assertion that the
greatest threat to Article 2(4) is not willful disregard, but instead the
2 13
prohibition's disintegration through liberalization.
This concern is urgent. It cannot be ignored by proponents of
expansionist claims. Yet, the standard of global justice facilitates
another form of consequentialist reasoning. The well-founded fear that
a lack of circumscription undermines the ad bellum regime can be
offset by demonstrating that the demands of justice are contingent on
the proposed expansionist action. As Alan Buchanan shows, the most
cogent means of advancing a rights claim is to identify an interest that
carries moral weight and then demonstrate why this interest demands

208.
209.

See id. at 41, 43.
See, e.g., Andreas Follesdal & Thomas Pogge, Introduction to REAL WORLD

JUSTICE: GROUNDS, PRINCIPLES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1 (Andreas

Follesdal & Thomas Pogge eds., 2005); see also Laura Valentini & Tiziana Torresi,
International Law and Global Justice: A Happy Marriage, 37 REV. INT'L STUD. 2035,

2036 (2011).
210. Compare RAWLS, supranote 206, at 10 (arguing that groups of peoples should
establish laws to reflect shared moral norms, despite any remaining inequality), with
THOMAS W. POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 92-94 (2002) (emphasizing

that conceptions of global justice should account for social and economic human rights
for all).
211.

RATNER, supra note 169, at 65; see also BUCHANAN, supra note 19, at 27.

212.
213.

RATNER, supra note 169, at 65.
D'Aspremont, supra note 16, at 1092.
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formal

protection. 214

The efficacious

expansionist

argument

is

grounded in an account of how the proposed action is consistent with a
justice-based vision of international law. The risks of expansionism

must be weighed against the consequences of inaction and the
proactive need to ensure the foundational interests of preserving peace
and ensuring human rights.

The contours and content of a global justice framework range.
John Rawls posits that determinations of justice are similar in both
their

domestic

and

international

manifestations. 215

The

latter

articulation of justice is, Rawls believes, contingent upon the freedom
and

independence

undertakings,

of

peoples,

compliance

the equality of peoples

with

treaties

and

who are parties to the

agreements that bind them, a duty of nonintervention, the notion that
war is only advanced in self-defense, honoring human rights,

observance of restrictions during the conduct of war, and a duty to
assist others living under unfavorable conditions. 216 Assessments of jus
ad bellum are, in Rawls's influential nonideal account, guided by just
war theory. 217 Recalling Augustinian values, Rawls contends that

"[t]he aim of a just war waged by a just well-ordered people is a just
218
and lasting peace among peoples."

Elsewhere, Alan Buchanan moves away from the Westphalian
boundaries accepted within the Rawlsian model. 219 Buchanan offers a
moral theory of international law. 220 Described as the "natural duty of
justice," Buchanan defends a minimal moral duty to ensure that all
persons have access to institutions that protect basic rights. 221
Accordingly, a moral theory of international law is structured upon an

account of international law's most important moral goals, the most
persuasive reasons to support the institution of international law as a
means of achieving its predetermined goals, a specification of the
conditions required to ensure the moral legitimacy of the international
legal system, and a justification of the substantive norms that

constitute the international legal system. 222 For Buchanan, a moral
account of international law understands the foremost purposes of the
international legal system to be the assurance of peace among and

within states and the provision of justice. 223

214. BUCHANAN, supra note 19, at 25-26.
215. RAwLs, supra note 206, at 4.
216. Id. at 37.
217. Id. at 89.
218. Id. at 94.
219. Allen Buchanan, Rawls's Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian
World, 110 ETHIcS 697, 701 (2000).
220. Id. at 698.
221. BUCHANAN, supra note 19, at 27.
222. Id. at 59-60.
223. Id. at 60.
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International law provides processes to transform moral
22 4
To reflect the
convictions into identifiable rules and norms.
expansionist purpose and to effectively link moral intuition and legal
prescription, arguments that stress the necessity of a particular use of

force must demonstrate why the proposed action is necessary to further
a vision of international law that is not merely desirable, but that

advances the purposes conveyed through the UN Charter's preamble.
An action grounded in a moral vision insulates the ad bellum regime.
Episodic ad bellum engagements may serve narrow or immediate
interests. However, their singular focus fails to convey a holistic
understanding of both why the action is required within the particular
circumstances and how it is a necessary undertaking, consistent with
or in advancement of, the just purposes of international law.
Steven Ratner provides an erudite framework to assess whether a
22 5
A norm is
particular norm satisfies the imposed standard of justice.
evaluated based on its capacity to advance international and intrastate
peace and to respect human rights. 226 The purpose of this Article has
not been to offer or endorse a particular vision of global justice. Instead,
it has sought to identify a standard that expansionist arguments may
apply to demonstrate the moral necessity of their claim-such an
argumentative structure will better reflect the strength of the
expansionist camp. While remaining conscious of the potential for
abuse and embracing the overall desire to restrict those instances in
which the use of force is permissible, the expansionist claim must
weigh these risks against an identifiable moral standard. The
persuasive appeal will be one that illustrates that the demands of
morality and the legitimacy of the international legal system compel
action despite well-founded reservations.

C. The Standardof Legal Soundness
An intricate body of law governs the use of force. While this Article
has emphasized the necessity of structuring ad bellum arguments
upon first order moral considerations, the resulting process is more
than a philosophical pursuit. Expansionist appeals must be placed
within an existing legal framework. It is, as Terry Nardin shows,
necessary to complement moral assessments with considerations of
legal appropriateness.2 2 7 A novel legal argument amends existing rules

and replaces accepted interpretations. Nardin suggests that the
proposed alteration conforms to underlying

(legal) principles and

224. See RATNER, supra note 169, at 1-2.
225. Id. at 84.
226. Id.
227. Terry Nardin, Justice and Authority in the Global Order, 37 REV. INT'L STUD.
2059, 2061 (2011).
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"must not contradict the integrity and coherence" of the relevant legal
system. 228
The proposed requirement of legal soundness introduces similar
criteria. Of course, not any moral proposition can claim legal status.
Certain characteristics and identifiers must be present to advance a
credible legal claim. This Article, however, resists a strictly positivist
vision of international law and its sources. Instead, the proposed
standard favors flexibility. This reflects Jeremy Waldron's observation
that the distinction between characterization and normativity in legal
argument is often blurry. 229 Recognizing that expansionist claims can

either be methodological assertions about what the law is, normative
contentions about what the law ought to be, or some admixture of both,
this final Part suggests that a standard of legal soundness (i) grounds
itself in a conception of the international rule of law and (ii) that it

demonstrates coherence. While the standard of justice provides
identifiable legal principles, a standard of legal soundness compels
proponents to link moral assertions with legal substance.
The first criterion holds that ad bellum appeals are based in a
particular notion of the international rule of law. While conceptions of

the rule of law are multi-faceted, varied, and contested, Waldron
demonstrates a degree of congruence amongst prevalent iterations.2 3 0
This reflects agreement that public norms should guide the exercise of

power and structure debates

regarding its use.2 3 1 For present

purposes, this is expanded into the international sphere and suggests

a straightforward understanding of the rule of law-that is, the notion
that the specific legal argument demonstrates compliance with or
furtherance of an identifiable legal principle or norm contained within

the relevant legal architecture.
This uncomplicated articulation is, as Ian Hurd explains, better

suited to the international sphere.23 2 Hurd demonstrates that the more
intricate traditional conceptions of the rule of law are not easily
transferable from the domestic to the international context.2 3 3 Instead
of imposing the latter on the former, Hurd proposes an understanding

of the international rule of law that is centered around adherence to
principles. 234 This reflects an "intellectual and political commitment"

228. Id.
229. Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 49
(2008).
230. Id. at 8-9.
231. See id. at 6 (noting that the prevailing conception of the rule of law requires
that those with authority exercise power according to public norms instead of their
personal preferences or ideologies).
232.

IAN HURD, How TO Do THINGS WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (2017).

233. Characteristics of the domestic rule of law, like the requirement that rules
are public and stable, that rules apply to governments as well as citizens, and that rules
are applied equally, fail to find easy international analogies. See id. at 12.
234. Id. at 18.
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to the notion that state behavior is expected to conform to relevant
international legal obligations. 2 35 The international rule of law then
manifests through the expectation that states employ the resources of
236
international law to explain and justify their actions and decisions.

From this, one may extrapolate that to argue in accordance with
this rule of law requirement one must ground contentions in an
identifiable legal principle(s). The principle anchors the assertion
within an existing deliberative environment. It provides a fulcrum for
further assessments-legal, moral, and political-of the proffered
contention. The identified principle need not advance a formalist
reading of the jus ad bellum; such a requirement is antithetical to the
expansionist camp's orientation. It is instead reflective of a Dworkinian
conception of principles that states an argumentative reason but does

not necessitate a particular decision. 23 7
It is not the intention of this Article to define or limit the potential
sources that may ground an expansionist contention within legal
discourse. Instead, it is simply suggested that reversion to the
aforementioned moral considerations provides an identifiable point of
commencement. The standard of global justice-understood as
affording primacy to the preservation of peace and the protection of
human rights-is entrenched within international law. 238 These
standards are so prevalent within the relevant legal frameworks that

Hersch Lauterpacht described the enactment of rules eliminating state
239
violence as international law's primordial duty.
The second criterion requires that ad bellum contentions exhibit

coherence. This appeal to legal coherence is concerned with the content
and application of the identified legal principle. 24 0 Any effective
expansionist argument should demonstrate a logical consistency both
across propositions and in the intended and (potential) future
implementation of the proposed reading. Both the underlying moral
assumption and the identified legal principle that supports the
expansionist claim must not profess to be sui generis but should
instead express uniform appropriateness.

Id. at 45.
236. Id.
237. See Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 26 (1967).
238. This recalls Steven Ratner's acknowledgement, noted above, that the
preservation of peace and the protection of human rights are enshrined in the UN
Charter's preamble, constitute customary international law, and are the subject of
235.

numerous treaties. See RATNER, supra note 169, at 65.
239. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNITY 64 (2000).
240. This notion of coherence may contrast with a separate notion of coherence
that is concerned with the unity and fragmentation of international law. See Yannick
Radi,

Coherence, in

FUNDAMENTAL

CONCEPTS

FOR

INTERNATIONAL

LAw:

THE

CONSTRUCTION OF A DISCIPLINE 105, 105-06 (Jean D'Aspremont & Sahib Singh eds.,
2019).
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This recalls Ronald Dworkin's account of law as integrity.2 4 1
Coherence, for Dworkin, requires that like cases are treated alike and
that the application of a particular rule is consistent with the general
principles expressed by the system from which it is derived. 24 2 Framing
expansionist claims as exceptions, compelled by unique conditions,

undermines the equal application requirement. A compelling moral
claim is applicable both when expediency demands action and in

circumstances where the assurance of justice does not convey an
obvious or immediate interest on actors that are otherwise proponents
of an expansionist approach.

The complications

that follow the inconsistent

or unequal

43
While consistent
application of (international) law are familiar.2

practice

assuages

requirement,

its

the

external

internal

component

features

merit

of

the

coherence

attention.

Franck

demonstrates that a rule, standard, or principle gains appeal if a
foundational principle conjoins the proposition with a network of other
rules. 244 Again, while it is not the present intention to provide a ridged

account of how such arguments must be structured, it is worth
recalling how the identified principle of justice-ubiquitous throughout

the UN Charter and the relevant bodies of law-may serve as a
lodestar for subsequent considerations and necessary features of an
efficacious ad bellum claim. It is also our hope that by structuring such
claims

around

first,

moral

considerations,

and

second,

legal

assessments, good-faith expansionist assertions can better navigate
well-founded concerns of abuse, erosion, and subjectivity.

V. CONCLUSION

If international law is conceived as a language, supplying the
vocabulary that structures legal interventions into many of the most
pressing global challenges, much is dependent on how the resulting
arguments are constructed. International lawyers continue to divide
on whether international law prescribes the form or the content of legal

appeals. 245 Regardless of one's preferred disposition, legal argument
assumes a central role in the resulting discourse. This Article has

241. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 178-81 (1986).
242. Id.
243. See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J.
INT'L L. 705, 738 (1988).
244. Id. at 741.
245. See, e.g., MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 1 (2005); see also Jean D'Aspremont, Uniting

Pragmatism and Theory in International Legal Scholarship: Koskenniemi's From
Apology to Utopia Revisited, 19 REVUE QUNBeCOISE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 353 (2006).
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considered the structure, efficacy, and consistency of this discourse
within contemporary debates regarding the jus ad bellum.
Perhaps unusually, we have not assumed a position on the legality
(or sensibility) of the particular use of force debates that have been

documented within the preceding Parts. It is likely that we would
diverge on several of these questions. We are instead motivated by the
form that the underlying arguments assume. Collectively, we sense a
great urgency in ensuring that international legal appeals reflect a
coherent vocabulary that will allow the discipline to navigate the
uncontemplated and the uncertain. We believe that the role and

persuasiveness of a legal appeal affects international law's capacity to
contribute to the process of redressing many of the most confounding
challenges that demand international attention within a nonideal

world.
If an advocate seeks to advance an international law-based claim
but does not know the identity or legal predilections of the audience
that will assess the claim's validity, she can proceed in several ways.
Whether in a classroom, a courtroom, or a political assembly, our
advocate wishes to offer the most effective argument possible to
advance a particular legal contention. To persuade the audience of the
argument's merit, she may use (i) a strictly legal argument; (ii) an
argument that offers policy or moral considerations; or (iii) an ideal
argument that features both legal and moral claims. However, in this
instance, it is not possible to credibly advance the third type of appeal.

Perhaps, the legal basis is weak. Or, the advocate may be insufficiently
prepared to articulate the necessary moral or policy grounds to

effectively make the claim. Denied the ideal option, we suggest that the
advocate's objective is most effectively advanced through adherence to
the argumentative
convictions.

form that is reflective of her strengths and

Expansionist ad bellum appeals are unable to provide a credible
black-letter reading of a Charter provision. They must work within an
existing architecture that is continuously strained. To avoid
stagnation, expansionists traditionally rely on moral implications and
policy considerations to produce legal arguments when a formalist
approach would unduly restrict what the expansionist purports is a
necessary action. Thus, the expansionist is unable to employ the ideal
argumentative
structure.
The emergent argumentative form,

documented

throughout

this

Article,

foregoes

the

principle

expansionist appeal by placing undue emphasis on legal claims that
endeavor to address minimalist apprehensions. In such a scenario, the
expansionist is unlikely to mollify the core minimalist concern. To fully

pacify minimalist fears would be to concede the expansionist position.
the
apprehensions,
minimalist
by prioritizing
Furthermore,
expansionist relinquishes the moral terms that have long-structured
international legal debates. Denied the ideal argumentative form, the
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emerging expansionist approach forgoes its normative allure and opts

for an unaccustomed style that is ill-positioned to persuade on terms
that reflect the strengths and convictions of the expansionist camp.
As these debates continue and evolve, as expansionist ad bellum

arguments are advanced or dismissed, numerous factors will influence
how legal claims are made. The nature of the threat faced and the
imminence and gravity of the impending atrocity will spur calls for

action. The motives of the intervening force and the prospect of success
will provide reason to pause. Often these debates divide along familiar
lines. They reflect jurisprudential schisms. And they are inseparable

from nonlegal influences. Our purpose has been to assure the place of
moral considerations within this matrix; to place them alongside
considerations of power, politics, pragmatism, formalism, legitimacy,
and feasibility as the international community continues to grapple

with law's role in redressing the most challenging circumstances facing
a nonideal world.

